Donald Trump’s re-election has the potential to change and challenge transatlantic security architecture. European government expectations of his administration and their preferences for reacting to a possible weakening of the transatlantic link and NATO have major implications for future European security development paths.

Consequently, gathering voices and impressions from around the continent helps delineate how European governments might react – and in what political constellations. To achieve this goal, we asked colleagues from around Europe two questions:

  1. What are your government’s expectations towards the new US administration in security and defence policy, particularly European security?
  2. Would your government prefer Europeanisation or intensified bilateralisation with the US if NATO would indeed be weakened?

This is a rolling publication that will continuously add entries, so stay tuned and follow regularly as we help decipher the puzzle that is the European security landscape.

Germany - Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz

There is likely a broad consensus among German centrist parties that constitute the current government – and will probably make up the future government – that Trump’s presidency will mean less US involvement in European security and defence. Its focus will lie in the Indo-Pacific and China, not Europe. Metrics, such as the two percent goal and the financing of NATO itself, are expected to become more important in the political messaging.

Historically, Germany prefers Europeanisation over bilateralisation with the USA. This is shown in the recent statement by Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius and his French counterpart, Sébastien Lecornu, aiming for a summit between France, Germany, Poland, Italy and the UK.

However, the relationship with the US is a peculiar exception, as demonstrated by the recent plan to station US long-range precision strike weapons in Germany. While this was very much driven by the close partnerships between Chancellor Olaf Scholz and President Joe Biden, it is likely that military necessity will force a new German government to somehow appease the new US administration.

Consequently, a selective rapprochement with the US seems likely in nuclear deterrence, long-range precision strikes and US bases in Germany, while other areas will see more European outreach, as shown by the European Sky Shield Initiative. Yet this outreach must not be transnational or even multinational per se, as especially German armament policy is currently driven by pragmatic bi- or mini-lateral tools, such as open framework contracts and imports that focus on the tempo of delivery.

Greece – Antonis Kamaras

An influential Greek-American community, particularly within the US Congress, the importance of the Suda Bay naval base for US interests in the Middle East, and major procurement decisions by US-manufactured weapon systems mean that US-Greek relations are fairly resilient and multifaceted.

Additionally, the expectation is that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign and defence policy – namely, vocal hostility to Israel and close ties to Russia that led to Turkey’s expulsion from the F35 programme during the first Trump administration – will continue to cost Turkey and benefit Greece in terms of how the US positions itself vis a vis the Greek-Turkish rivalry during Trump’s second term.

Regarding the EU’s vocation as a collective security provider, Greece is unique among NATO’s 32 member countries in that NATO’s Article 5 does not protect it from its major national security threat, which emanates from fellow NATO member and non-EU member Turkey. Consequently, Greece is invested in the Europeanisation of defence more than most EU member states. While the Greek government still prizes its relationship with the US, it will continue to invest in the EU’s emergent strategic autonomy. This will be done through major weapon acquisitions from fellow EU-member countries, especially France, participation in EU military missions, as is the case with ASPIDES operation in the Red Sea, and ongoing support of the Ukrainian war effort.

United Kingdom - Trevor Taylor

The UK’s Labour Government is only four months old and some of their politicians are having to adjust to a world where their open-source views are closely monitored by a wide range of stakeholders. The government’s formal reaction to President Trump’s election has been measured and conventional, offering congratulations to the winner and waiting to see the behaviour that will emerge. Behind the scenes, there will be fence-mending efforts underway since some elements of the Labour Party, including some MPs, made clear their distaste for the Republican candidate in the run-up to the election.

However, well before the US election result, the Labour leadership was clear that it saw the need to reset and rebuild the UK’s wider relationships with continental European countries and European bodies, including the EU. Trump’s election has reinforced the importance of this effort. The Trinity House agreement with Germany and Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit to Paris for French Remembrance Day commemorations are two recent manifestations of this policy line.

Estonia – Tony Lawrence

Estonia certainly expects the Trump administration to demand Europe contributes more to security. This is also an Estonian priority, with officials arguing that the country’s own high levels of defence spending will give it good standing with the second Trump presidency.

More broadly, on other priorities such as support for Ukraine and US commitment to NATO, officials have noted that much will depend on how vague campaign slogans are implemented, and who is tasked with doing so. But a common public message has been that Estonia is on the right path, and there is no need to revise the basic contours of its own security and defence policies.

While Estonia wants Europe to contribute more, it sees US engagement in European security as essential. It has become more positive about European defence arrangements, especially European Union (EU) support to building military capability, where it has strongly resisted ‘buy Europe’ policies.

However, Estonia has worked to build security through NATO and maintain healthy relations with the US. While circumstances may eventually necessitate a choice between more Europeanisation and increased bilateralisation with the US, this is not a choice that Estonia would wish to make today.

Norway – Paal Sigurd Hilde

While Trump’s election victory was not welcomed in Oslo, it was not a surprise, like the 2016 win. For some time already, Norwegian authorities have sought to establish relations with people who could end up in influential positions in a new Trump administration. As the shape of Trump’s new government becomes clearer, this effort will likely intensify.

Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of Norwegian expectations for the second Trump term. In security and defence circles, the experience from the first Trump presidency was not entirely negative. While Trump caused much noise at the political level, on the working level, Norwegian bilateral, multilateral and NATO-related cooperation with US military and intelligence services increased. In Oslo, the hope is that the second Trump term will turn out similarly.

The preferred option for Norway, based on historical ties and strategic interests, will be to maintain relations with the US. Even if Trump weakens the US commitment to NATO, Norway expects US strategic interest, notably keeping track of the Russian submarines based on the Kola Peninsula near the Norwegian border, to perpetuate Norwegian-US cooperation – at least in the intelligence field.

In recent years, concerns about a weakened US commitment to European security, has spurred Norwegian activism towards European defence cooperation. A decisive shift away from the traditional transatlantic focus towards a European orientation is only likely if outrageous acts by Trump make continued cooperation politically unpalatable.

Romania - Claudiu Degeratu

Romania foresees two key themes emerging. Firstly, there is increased uncertainty regarding NATO's role in the Ukraine conflict, influenced by Trump's re-election, Hungary's stance, and other allies that are less prone to supporting Ukraine militarily. If the US reduces its involvement, implementing decisions concerning assistance coordination agreed at the NATO Washington Summit may be hindered. Romanian officials are sceptical about Europe's ability to fill the void that may be left if the American deterrent and defence role are cut or reduced in the short term.

Secondly, Romania is concerned about the potential repercussions of renewed US-Russian strategic dialogue linked to a peace plan for Ukraine. Although not publicly vocal, the Romanian government seeks consultation and prefers a bilateral approach with the US. If irreconcilable positions exist, Romania would prefer to avoid choosing sides between the US and Europe. The Romanian government will not take a proactive stance in response to these developments. Still, it has three objectives: to enhance the balanced presence of allied and US forces in Romania; to pursue a unified allied solution for a Black Sea security strategy; and to strengthen Moldova's security against Russian hybrid threats.

Sweden – Eva Hagström Frisell

Having become a NATO ally less than a year ago, maintaining strong transatlantic relations is vital for Sweden. The Swedish government recognises US demands for Europe to take more responsibility for its security, including support for Ukraine.

The government wants to keep the US engaged, mainly by demonstrating that Sweden and its fellow countries in the Nordic-Baltic region are taking their fair share of the burden. This comprises decisions to strengthen the support to Ukraine, increase defence spending and contribute to NATO’s operations in the region. Sweden also shares US concerns about China, signalling an enhanced security and defence engagement with partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

In an era of transatlantic tensions, Sweden will continue to support further EU security and defence integration as a complement to NATO. However, bilateral relations with the US will likely be the top priority. Sweden is one of the European countries most likely to tolerate and try to manage a stormier transatlantic relationship. Sweden hopes to fill recently signed defence agreements, such as the bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement and the State Partnership Program with the state of New York, with activities and increased US military presence in the country.

Lithuania – Dr. Justinas Juozaitis

While the Social Democrats won the Lithuanian parliamentary elections, the programme for the new three-party coalition government has not been published yet. That said, Lithuanian expectations towards cooperation with the US in security and defence transcend election cycles and party politics.

Traditionally, Lithuanian governments have identified the US military presence in Europe and its leadership in NATO as key pillars of European security. The new ruling coalition is not expected to deviate from this established norm. As a result, the new government will continue strengthening Lithuania’s security ties with the US, while persuading Washington to maintain a battalion-sized deployment in Lithuania after 2025.

In Lithuania, there are little-to-no discussions about the potential choice between Europeanisation of defence and intensified bilateralisation with the US. Instead of considering alternative choices, the new government will search for ways to maintain and, if possible, strengthen US-EU relations.

Perceiving the EU as a potential source of funding for dual-use infrastructure, defence industry and critical infrastructure protection, Lithuania will support developments in EU’s defence and security that complement – but do not replace – NATO’s collective defence arrangements. Naturally, it is expected that there will be a particular interest in developing the European defence industry after former Lithuanian PM Andrius Kubilius became the first EU Commissioner for Defence and Space.

France – Jean-Pierre Maulny

France anticipates two major actions from Trump. First, it is expected that the US will not withdraw from NATO, but the American contribution may be reduced in terms of number of troops and military capabilities deployed in Europe.

Second, Trump is likely to pursue bilateral negotiations with European countries to maintain the US security guarantee in return for sales of American arms to European buyers. This would provide him with proof that Europeans are making necessary financial efforts to ensure their own security.

France is not really asking the question of Europeanisation or intensified bi-lateralisation with the US as it stands. Rather, it believes bilateral discussions with the US will focus on ensuring Europeans procurement of American weapons. But France intends to continue its practice of acquiring US armaments only when necessary – and when no equivalent European solution exists. At the same time, France will continue to advocate sustained American involvement in European security.

Acknowledging that it is unlikely that Trump’s position can be reversed, France’s policy will be twofold. First, it will strengthen its contribution within NATO, given its irreplaceable defence capabilities and other tools to organise collective defence, from strategic planning to operational military planning. And second, France is expected to strengthen its efforts within the EU.

Indeed, the EU provides mechanisms to finance defence, introduce regulations that encourage the development of military capabilities within a collective framework, and enhance the competitiveness of the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which is essential to developing advanced EU strategic autonomy.

Italy – Ivan Zaccagnini

After Trump’s election, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni expressed Italy’s willingness to work in close coordination with the US on all major international dossiers, starting with the war in Ukraine and the Middle East crisis, with the common goal of promoting stability and security, including in the framework of relations with the EU.

Italy expects Trump’s election to shift US strategic priorities towards the Indo-Pacific and, consequently, less involvement in Ukraine. However, Rome is keen to continue deepening bilateral military and industrial collaboration with Washington. In fact, while Italy continues to support Ukraine in line with the allies, the country has reaffirmed its commitment to support the US in the Indo-Pacific. This was demonstrated by the summer 2024 participation of an Italian carrier strike group in joint exercises and maritime security operations in the region.

The Italian government aims to maintain a balanced approach, while promoting continuity for close cooperation with the US. It emphasises the need to maintain strong transatlantic relations while advocating for stronger European defence integration, especially within an EU strategic autonomy framework. Externally, the country aims to exploit its position and become the preferential interlocutor and mediator between the US and the EU. Internally, Trump’s election could undermine the government cohesion by increasing tensions between Meloni’s party, Fratelli d’Italia, and Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini’s Lega per Salvini Premier.

Hungary – Tamas Csiki

Republican victory in the US is a great political win for the Hungarian government in the short term. In terms of security and defence, mutually mirrored reflections on an anti-immigration agenda and a hoped/promoted end to the Russia-Ukraine war are solid foundations. But it is still unclear on whose terms would the US promote/force initial negotiations.

Even though Hungarian interests do not demand a wrecked Ukraine as Hungarians living across the border will suffer the fate of Ukraine at large, and Russia is not a desirable direct neighbour, several concessions from Kyiv might be acceptable for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, including so-called territory for peace arrangements and the Finlandisation of Ukraine. What could be more important for Budapest, is a hoped-for reset of Western-Russian relations under Trump, and a return to the status quo ante 2022.

Austria – Helena Quis

In Austria, security policy is inextricably linked to neutrality. This principle is unlikely to change, even under a second Trump presidency and changing European defence realities. As a non-NATO but EU member state, Austria holds a unique position in Europe alongside Ireland, Malta and Cyprus, distinguished only by its comfortable location in the heart of the bloc, surrounded by NATO states. As a result, while Europe has traditionally relied on the US as its main security guarantor, Austria has leaned on the rest of Europe.

A second Trump presidency will have mixed effects on Austria. Although the country has no special security relationship with the US, a weakened NATO could leave it in a vulnerable position. At the same time, uncertainty surrounding US security guarantees could drive a shift in European security and defence cooperation away from NATO towards alternative frameworks that are more compatible with Austria’s neutral stance. Chief among these is the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, which is central to the country’s security strategy, and the Three Seas Initiative, which aligns closely with Austria’s comprehensive security concept.

Simultaneously, Trump’s assertiveness in addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Israel-Hamas conflict rekindle Austria’s traditional role as a "venue for international dialogue." A proposal to this effect is already on Trump’s desk.

About the authors

Christian Mölling is Director of the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Europe's Future Program.

Torben Schütz is Senior Expert for European Security Policy at the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Tony Lawrence is the Head of the Defence Policy & Strategy Programme and a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security - EESTI Estonia.

Antonis Kamaras is a Research Associate at the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).

Paal Sigurd Hilde is Professor at the is Associate Professor and Head of Section for Norwegian Security Policy at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS).

Claudiu Deregatu is a Senior Researcher and independent consultant.

Trevor Taylor is Director of the Defence, Industries & Society Programme and Professorial Fellow in Defence management at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

Eva Hagström Frisell is Deputy Research Director at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

Justinas Juozaitis, Head of World Politics Research Group at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania

Ivan Zaccagnini is a PhD Student at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB).

Jean-Pierre Maulny is Deputy Director, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques.

Tamas Csiki is Senior Research Fellow at the John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics.

Helena Quis is an intern at the Europe’s Future Programme at Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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