A New Transatlantic Bargain: Strengthening the European Pillar of Collective Defence

The transatlantic alliance between Europe and the United States has been the crux of European security for more than 75 years. But worsening geopolitical threats – most notably Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine – and a shift in US views on Europe’s contribution to its own defence create the need for a recalibration of responsibilities. European countries have long relied on the US for their defence – and this imbalance is no longer sustainable.

The Belfer Center’s Task Force Report, A New Transatlantic Bargain: The Case for Building a Strong European Pillar, argues that Europe must assume a greater share of the defence burden to ensure its own security and maintain the integrity of NATO.

The 14 members of the task force, drawing on high-level experience in countries from the US and the UK to Poland and North Macedonia, argue that more balance in this relationship will not only be in Europe’s interest, but reinforce Washington’s global strategic position. Therefore, they write, Europe and the US should proactively engage in strengthening the European pillar.

The following is a summary of their arguments. For more, including information about the task force members, read the full report here.

How to strengthen the European pillar

Europe is vulnerable because of its dependence on US military power. For more than a decade, Washington has made clear in subtle policy realignments and provocative statements alike that its ability and willingness to shoulder European defence is diminishing.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which brought full-scale war to Europe’s border, simultaneously showed the strength and solidarity of NATO members and highlighted Europe’s vulnerability. Urgent action from European nations is required to prevent strategic irrelevance in the years to come.

The priority is an increase in European defence spending. European nations should bring military expenditures to approximately three percent of GDP, surpassing NATO’s current two percent minimum threshold – and treating this as a floor, rather than a ceiling, moving forward.

But what will this money be spent on? The goal should be enhancing European force readiness. In 10 years’ time, European NATO members should be able to field 70 to 80 percent of the troops for NATO’s new force model. Currently, that model aims to enable the deployment of 100,000 troops in 10 days within Europe’s territory, and up to 500,000 in one to six months. Achieving this will require infrastructure investments, such as standardised rail gauges and stronger bridges to effectively deploy forces across the continent.

Beyond personnel and mobility, capabilities should be strengthened too. Europe needs to invest in an array of military logistical necessities to keep operations in action. These include aerial refuelling, intelligence and surveillance, missile defence and electronic warfare.

Lastly, the task force recommends that European nations build a six-month inventory of critical resources, including ammunition, fuel and spare parts for military vehicles. Reflecting on the billions in funds sent to Ukraine, along with the ammunition donated in recent years, helps one understand how critical these supplies are to the success – or failure – of national defence.

To accomplish this, the European defence industry requires consolidation. European countries should cooperate to develop fewer, but more standardised, platforms and boost cooperation with key EU and non-EU defence partners, such as the UK and Turkey.

The role of the US and NATO

While Europe must shoulder more of the defence burden, the US remains a critical partner in ensuring collective security. The US should maintain a significant military presence in Europe as long as security threats persist, reaffirm its commitment to NATO’s collective defence principle (Article V), and proactively collaborate on armament production and technology sharing. Just because Europe should take a larger share of the burden, this does not mean the close relationship is over.

NATO should be prepared to increase European leadership within its command structure as these goals are met. Interoperability across European equipment procurement must be improved through more standardised equipment, training programmes and communication protocols. A new Deterrence and Defence Review Posture needs to be developed by NATO to update its strategy across conventional and nuclear deterrence and encourage the US administration to re-focus on nuclear arms control.

The path ahead

The US and the increasingly threatening geopolitical landscape demand that Europe rise to the occasion. A sincere, collective effort to strengthen the European defence pillar within NATO will not only secure the continent against foreign threats but reinforce the transatlantic relationship. This will require forming political in a way that will take policymakers and the electorate outside its comfort zone.

Difficult decisions lie ahead on sustained investment and close collaboration between European nations on defence production and capabilities. Additionally, this collaboration needs to extend to partners in the US, as well as those outside the EU but inside NATO, such as the UK and Turkey, and important Asia-Pacific partners. If Europe fails to act, the status quo will bring political discord between Europe and its allies, and weakness in confronting urgent challenges.

A new transatlantic bargain can strengthen European defence capabilities and sustain US engagement. With action, the transatlantic alliance can adapt and ensure stability and security for the future.

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