Security policy is once again in the spotlight. The new US administration is sending mixed signals about its commitment to European defence and pursuing its peace plan for Ukraine without its allies, while in Europe, a debate has ignited about a potential future deployment of Western forces to Ukraine.

Consequently, gathering voices and impressions from around the continent helps delineate how European governments might react – and in what political constellations. To achieve this goal, we asked colleagues from around Europe two questions:

  1. Is your government reconsidering the transatlantic security relationship and its importance in light of the recent events?
  2. What is the position of your government on providing troops to a European mission to Ukraine?

This is a rolling publication that will continuously add entries, so stay tuned and follow regularly as we help decipher the puzzle that is the European security landscape.

 

Estonia – Tony Lawrence

The Trump administration’s attack challenges fundamental tenets of Estonia’s security, but it has been too sudden, furious and volatile to prompt a serious reassessment of transatlantic relations.

Like most European states, Estonia can only try to navigate through these uncertain times. Its perception that US military engagement is essential to deter Russia is unchanged. Around 600 US troops are currently deployed in Estonia. This means Estonia will seek to continue to work with the US wherever possible.

The conviction that Russia must not be allowed to prevail in Ukraine remains unchanged. Officials have not shied away from publicly criticising the position the US has taken in bilateral negotiations with Russia and for Trump’s attacks on President Zelenskyy.

While Estonia has committed to continuing to support Ukraine, the country quietly recognises the need to strengthen European defence arrangements. Above all, it insists, European states must get serious about increasing defence spending. This is justified by the growing threat from Russia, rather than fears of US abandonment.

The government has not engaged in any open discussions about a European mission to Ukraine, suggesting such conversations are premature while the war continues. The public line emphasises putting Ukraine in the best possible position for any future negotiations.

Slovakia – Jozef Hrabina

Slovakia, historically a NATO member state with low public support for the alliance, maintains an ambiguous political stance toward NATO. This is reflected in internal discussions at the Slovak Ministry of Defence (MoD), which have been heavily focused on potential divisions within NATO.

According to a high-ranking MoD official, Slovakia perceives its exclusion from the February Paris Summit as a sensitive issue, particularly as part of NATO’s eastern flank. This region, largely absent from the summit, is expected to bear the primary burden of containing Russia after the current phase of the war in Ukraine ends.

Slovak officials anticipate an internal split within NATO, with Western European countries, led by France and Germany, attempting to shape EU defence policies, Meanwhile, the eastern flank is expected to become more militarised and aligned with US security strategies through bilateral agreements.

Despite these challenges, Slovakia remains committed to NATO membership, viewing multilateral alliances as essential for maintaining its national security. Officials acknowledge the importance of the US as a unifying factor for NATO’s eastern members and emphasise the need for Slovakia to remain part of these frameworks.

Since 2024, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has consistently opposed the deployment of European soldiers to Ukraine, citing concerns over conflict escalation. In early 2025, he reiterated this position, signalling the Slovak government’s firm stance against participation in any unified EU mission. The government believes such missions should fall under the purview of the UN rather than the EU.

But there are indications that Slovakia would consider a limited contribution in specific circumstances. For example, Prime Minister Fico has expressed willingness to deploy Slovakia’s engineering corps to Ukraine, particularly de-mining units, provided there is a signed peace agreement. This nuanced position underscores Slovakia’s cautious approach to direct involvement in Ukraine, while maintaining readiness to contribute to post-conflict recovery under appropriate conditions.

Greece – Antonis Kamaras

For any Greek government, the US administration’s blatant acceptance of the conquest of Ukrainian territory, and determination to negotiate a settlement directly with Russia and not with Ukraine, are anathema. The implications are that in any future military conflict between Greece and Turkiye, the US will not put a ceiling, based on the inviolability of sovereign borders, on Turkish war aims. Consequently, Greece will play the cards it has with the US administration while doubling down on its support of the EU as a collective security provider.

Because of Turkiye’s membership of NATO, the alliance’s Article 5 never addressed Greece’s national security needs. This means there has never been the domestic political legitimacy to risk the lives of Greek soldiers in NATO-led military operations. Sending troops as part of a force to control the situation in Ukraine, even with a European mission, would send shockwaves through Greek public opinion. However, the Greek government will take this risk.

Owing to the US administration’s radical departure from its post WWII policy, Greece is now more exposed to Turkiye’s revisionism than at any time since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Free-riding is simply not an option.

Bosnia and Herzegovina – Srecko Latal

People and politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina have divergent views on transatlantic security relations, usually related to their ethnic background and/or political affiliation.

Following Trump’s decisions and statements in relation to Ukraine, most Bosniak citizens and politicians fear that possible American political and military withdrawal from Europe would leave Bosnia unprotected, leading to new ethnic violence in the country and the region.

Conversely, Bosnian Serb leaders see these developments as an opportunity for a new secession attempt for Bosnian Serb-dominated territories from the rest of the country. Any such attempt, if left unchecked by the US and EU, would likely lead to new ethnic violence.

Bosnia and Herzegovina armed forces have been participating in UN peacekeeping missions, including those in Afghanistan, Congo and Mali. But divergent political and geopolitical views among the different ethnic leaders, mean these forces would not participate in an EU mission in Ukraine as long as the war continues.

Sweden – Calle Håkansson

Swedish politicians have sought to tread carefully regarding political decisions emerging from the Trump White House. They have emphasised the need to remain calm in the face of US rhetoric and, so far, they have been cautious in criticising the US administration. But in light of the growing uncertainties surrounding US support for Europe, the Swedish government has stressed that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security, highlighting the need to increase defence spending across Europe and shoulder a larger share of the burden for defence and security.

The Swedish political landscape has emphasised that Europe must continue supporting Ukraine. In late January, the Swedish parliament approved its largest military aid package to date. Valued at more than 1.2 billion euros, this package includes new air defence systems, as well as Ukrainian defence industry and production funding.

Regarding discussions on providing troops for a European mission to Ukraine, the government has stressed that no options have been ruled out. It is quite likely that Sweden would contribute troops in some form, if such a European mission is implemented. However, given Sweden’s national defence responsibilities and commitments within NATO, its armed forces’ resources are limited. Furthermore, such a mission can only proceed if a deal is reached that is acceptable to Ukraine.

Bulgaria – Yordan Bozhilov

Relations between Bulgaria and the US have often been described as strategic, based on shared values and interests. In recent years, cooperation has been particularly intense in security and defence, nuclear energy and education. But statements from the US administration regarding European security, the war in Ukraine and the future of transatlantic relations have taken Bulgaria’s political establishment and society by surprise.

It is evident that transatlantic relations are undergoing a profound transformation and that Europe must assume a greater role in its own security and defence. Because of the many unknowns, a substantive debate or statements from politicians regarding the broader shift in these relations and its implications for Europe and Bulgaria are largely absent.

On 21 February 2025, all major political parties in the Bulgarian Parliament adopted a declaration of “non-participation of Bulgarian armed forces in military missions on Ukrainian territory” to address public concern over potential involvement of Bulgarian military personnel in combat operations in Ukraine.

Bulgarian society remains divided on the war in Ukraine, with a significant portion of the population maintaining a favourable view of Russia. This sentiment is rooted primarily in history, as Bulgaria regained its independence following the Russo-Turkish Wars of the 19th century. In the national consciousness, Russia has traditionally been regarded as a “liberator,” and the notion of Bulgarian troops engaging in potential hostilities against Russia remains highly unpopular.

Although positive perceptions of Russia have significantly declined since the war’s onset, they remain substantial and continue to influence Bulgaria’s domestic politics.

Netherlands – Lotje Boswinkel

Rhetoric from the US administration has not gone unnoticed in the Netherlands. On 17 February, Prime Minister Dick Schoof joined key European leaders in Paris for emergency talks, following visits to the continent by Vice President JD Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. The next day, the Dutch parliament discussed President Donald Trump’s remarks about Ukraine and the consequences for European security.

While most government officials and politicians agree that Europe finds itself at a turning point, many still grapple with what this means for Europe’s relationship with Washington. In Paris, Schoof suggested that American messages should not be viewed as a sign of disengagement but rather a push for fairer burden-sharing. In parliament, uncertainty was expressed about the extent of a potential US retreat, while many acknowledged that any future relationship will be contingent on a much stronger Europe.

When it comes to securing a future deal in Ukraine, a majority in parliament is open to consider military participation in a potential European mission, while highlighting that it would be premature to make any concrete commitments yet. Prime Minister Schoof expressed a willingness to consider sending troops, but mentioned US backing as a key condition: “When things get out of hand, we need to be able to count on the Americans vis-a-vis Russia.”

Geert Wilders, leader of PVV, the largest coalition party, remains vehemently opposed to sending Dutch troops. However, on related topics, including higher defence spending and additional military support to Ukraine, the PVV has walked back previous opposition as a result of “changing circumstances.” In parliament last week, Wilders said he would consider other type of contributions – including “material, money or planes” – should a European mission be created under the right conditions and circumstances: “We will not walk away from such responsibility.”

Slovenia – Jelena Juvan

Despite events and statements coming from President Trump and members of his administration since the inauguration, Slovenia remains strongly devoted to the current transatlantic security relations, supporting the NATO alliance and viewing the US as an important partner of the EU and of Slovenia.

Only collective security and collective defence is appropriate solution for Slovenia. So far, there have not been any changes in formal statements from government’s officials, and the dial has not moved significantly in public discourse. But some pro-Russian groups, such as the Group of Russian-Slovenian Friendship, which existed before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have become louder.

The official government position is that only a peace operation authorised by a UN Security Council resolution – and with the formal approval of Russia and Ukraine – is the only possible and acceptable solution. This is the only condition under which Slovenia will consider deploying its’ soldiers. However, there is not much talk about sending troops, apart from a few questions from journalists. Government officials emphasise that it is too soon to talk about a potential peace operation and possible deployment, as there are still too many questions that have to be answered.

Spain – Félix Arteaga

The Spanish government and its president, Pedro Sánchez, have criticised the US administration’s bullying diplomacy and its unilateral and geopolitical approach, which threatens democracy, digital sovereignty and the security of the European Union.

Consequently, Spain has participated in all meetings between European leaders to discuss a common European position regarding the US on all tensions that have opened up in recent weeks. This includes peace negotiations and military support for Ukraine. Spain has always maintained transatlantic relations with NATO and European relations with the EU on an equal footing, prioritising bilateral security and defence agreements with the US. But statements and gestures from the US administration towards Europe may force Spain to reconsider its position.

In Kyiv, Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez has presented a plan for 1 billion euros in military aid for Ukraine, but considers talk about deploying troops to be premature while negotiations are still in the early stages. Spain is one of the largest contributors of troops to NATO and EU operations, and could contribute to Ukraine if the operation were mandated by a multilateral organisation, with terms of reference acceptable to its armed forces – and with operational backing from NATO.

Portugal – Felipe Pathé Duarte

Portugal is a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance and maintains strong defence ties with the US and NATO. The relationship with the US under President Donald Trump has involved continuity and new challenges. The Portuguese government views this relationship as essential and seeks stability, regardless of political changes.

Recent US trade tariffs have raised concerns in Portugal, underscoring the need for dialogue between the EU and the US to avoid escalations that could adversely affect low-income consumers.

In terms of defence, the Trump administration has proposed that NATO members increase military spending to five percent of their GDP. Currently, Portugal invests 1.55 percent of GDP in defence, making it difficult to meet this target. The Lajes Base in the Azores plays a crucial role in US-Portugal relations, and the Trump administration’s position on its military presence is closely monitored. The strategic relevance of Lajes remains significant amid changing geopolitical conditions.

Portugal has adopted a diplomatic approach to maintain stable transatlantic relations, while balancing its national interests with US directives. Additionally, Portugal supports Ukraine with military and humanitarian aid, but there is ongoing debate regarding the deployment of Portuguese troops to Ukrainian territory, with no consensus among political leaders.

Romania – Claudiu Degeratu

The Romanian government’s cautious approach, particularly towards the American initiative to resolve the war in Ukraine, is important. With the presidential elections in May and an interim president, Romania is expected to maintain an international relations status quo. The transatlantic relationship crisis is acknowledged by Romanian officials, but the issue of the credibility of allied defence and solidarity is more crucial.

Interim President Ilie Bolojan’s statements have been unequivocal. He firmly believes that Ukraine’s security is Europe’s security, so Romania supports the principle of indivisible Euro-Atlantic security. The official positions indicate Romania’s acceptance of an increased European contribution to collective defence. But it is clear that this contribution cannot fully replace the American security guarantees in the short or medium term. Romania remains committed to the principle of transatlantic solidarity but acknowledges the absence of immediate solutions.

Additionally, interim President Ilie Bolojan has resolutely avoided an official position on sending Romanian troops. His call for consultations on recent developments and the preparation of Romania’s position at the extraordinary European Council on 6 March demonstrates the country’s prudent approach.

After consulting with the parties, the president plans to convene a Supreme Council of National Defence. The political positions expressed are generally against troop participation, including the opposition of Crin Antonescu, a joint presidential candidate of the Liberals, Social Democrats and the Hungarian party, UDMR. It is estimated that Romania will continue to avoid sending troops, instead focusing on providing logistics, military and humanitarian support, and offering bases for international contingent troop transit.

Norway – Paal Hilde

In Norway, like most of Europe, the Trump administration’s dramatic reversal of decades of traditional US foreign and security policy has been met by disbelief and dismay. While opposition politicians on the political left have argued that Norway must now look elsewhere for security, the government and mainstream parties have toed a careful line. Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre has repeatedly criticised statements made by Trump and other US officials but maintains that US positions are still developing and not fixed.

The Norwegian government will likely continue to try to engage the Trump administration in an attempt to change or moderate its policies, likely as part of a broader, coordinated, European or international approach. Additionally, Norway will likely go far in supporting European initiatives to facilitate a reasonable, negotiated end to the war in Ukraine.

While Støre has deflected questions about participation in a European peacekeeping or deterrence mission to Ukraine as premature, it would be surprising if Norway did not offer to contribute, if establishing such a force becomes part of a deal.

Denmark – Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen

The Danish government maintains that the transatlantic security relationship is pivotal for Danish security. This is true of the bilateral relationship with the US and the multilateral relationship, as institutionalised by NATO.

However, the Trump administration has considerably strained bilateral relations by demanding “ownership and control” over Greenland. This has happened in tandem with the multilateral relationship strained by the Trump administration’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine on terms that are deemed unfavourable to Ukraine, as well as to European security in Copenhagen.

The Danish government hopes to galvanise NATO’s multilateral security relationship by backing a European Ukraine force. Copenhagen evidently hopes to be able to trade some of this increased European security cooperation to support on the Greenland portfolio. There is strong public support for Ukraine’s membership of the EU and NATO, as well as 53 percent support for sending Danish troops to a European mission to Ukraine, according to Voxmeter poll on 18 February.

The government has allocated 6.7 billion euros on top of previous commitments to defence procurement for the next two years. This allows the government to participate in a European Ukraine force, while simultaneously rearming its forces.

Hungary – Tamas Csiki

Security concerns are not being voiced by the Hungarian government. Instead, the option of rapprochement with Russia with an economic appeal is promoted – particularly regarding energy imports – while Ukrainian and related European security interests are not taken into meaningful consideration. To my understanding, no concern has been expressed regarding a possible US-Russian grand bargain that is made over the heads of Europe. Rather, there is an acceptance that Europe has no place at the table regarding negotiations to end Russian aggression in Ukraine, echoing the Trump administration’s messages.

In a general sense, the continued political messaging is about the need to strengthen European defence and the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), but no concrete proposals have been formulated. Joint funding schemes for developing EDTIB are mostly refused, which casts doubt on support for integration in defence efforts.

The Orban government flatly rejects the idea of providing troops for a mission to Ukraine, whether within an EU or NATO Europe format – and would not join any ad hoc coalition either.

Türkiye – Sine Özkarasahin

As one of the first nations to openly condemn Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, Ankara has been a strategic ally and firm supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. For Ankara, the Crimean issue extends beyond politics and spills over to the discussions on history and ethnicity. For the incumbent government, the peninsula, with a large Crimean Tatar population, is of utmost importance in the Turkic-Muslim discourse.

Since the invasion of Crimea, Türkiye significantly helped rebuild the Ukrainian navy with MILGEM Ada-class corvettes, which have suffered heavy losses. With a share of the platforms built in Ukrainian shipyards, the MILGEM project contributed to bolstering Türkiye’s defence, technological and industrial base. Recently, this cooperation spilled over to other strategically important domains, including precision weapons and aerospace technologies, resulting in a strategic partnership embedded in trust built over the years.

Following Trump’s re-election, Türkiye’s unchanged assertive support to Ukraine’s victory and territorial integrity stood out. Erdogan reiterated Türkiye’s willingness to act as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv at the negotiation table. Having led multiple initiatives, such as a large-scale prisoner swap and the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Ankara has experience in this context.

Besides its pro-Ukrainian stance, Ankara is trying to keep its position as a bridge between the two belligerents. This means that deploying boots on the ground in Ukraine is not on the agenda for Türkiye.

Germany – Torben Schütz

Ongoing developments in transatlantic relations seem to lead to a significant shift in German security and defence policy. The likely new conservative chancellor, Friedrich Merz, himself a die-hard transatlanticist, said in various interviews that Europe will have to “take defence in our own hands”, including discussions for an alternative nuclear deterrence agreement with European partners.

In principle, this position will likely find support with his first choice for the coalition partner, the Social Democrats. But the devil lies in the detail. Procedurally, increasing German military capabilities heavily depends on reforming the constitutional debt brake, which might be tricky in the new parliament, or rushed, if brought to the vote before the current parliament is dissolved.

The plans presented so far – exempting defence spending above 1 percent of GDP from the debt brake – would provide great leeway for rebuilding the Bundeswehr. Organisationally, it will take time for the armed forces to rethink deterrence and defence without the US. This might be more difficult in Germany, compared to other European countries, because of the enormously close integration of the Bundeswehr with US forces in the past 70 years.

At the same time, all centrist parties say it is too early to discuss the deployment of German forces to Ukraine, with the framework for such a deployment being unknown. While the extreme left is open for a UN mandate, the extreme right does not want to deploy German soldiers. In the end, it will require a parliamentary discussion and decision.

Serbia –  Iztok Bojovic

Given that Serbia is a self-proclaimed military neutral country and not an active member of the transatlantic security architecture – apart from being a member of the Partnership for Peace programme – current developments in transatlantic relations will not significantly influence the country’s position. However, there is a visible attempt to align its interests with the new Trump administration.

It is more realistic that the Serbian government will pursue aligning its position with the US and Russian positions, rather than the EU. This became apparent when Serbia voted for the US version of resolution on Ukraine adopted by the UN Security Council, rather than the version drafted by the EU.

The main strategic position of current Serbian government is to pursue a foreign policy of balancing between the EU, US, China and Russia, as well as maintaining an ambiguous position towards the conflict in Ukraine. This means it is unlikely that Serbia will assume active role in providing troops to a European mission to Ukraine.

On the other hand, Serbia has contributed to various EU-led missions worldwide in the past, so there is potential for anon-combat military contributions, such as logistics and medical services. It can be expected that support to EU-led missions may be more substantial following if the government changes in favour of a more pro-EU option. Snap elections can be held anytime, particularly in the current social and political climate, and increasing pressure could lead to the formation of some sort of transitional government.

Italy – Alessandro Marrone

The Meloni government has established good bilateral relations with the Trump administration through a number of meetings and contacts. Rome’s expectation was a wake-up call on defence spending and the pursuit of peace talks on the Russia-Ukraine war. But White House threats to the Ukrainian leadership, while changing strategy and narrative on this dossier, has prompted lively reflection across the Italian political spectrum.

A plurality of views has emerged within and beyond the ruling coalition, and the debate is heavily polarised by Trump’s divisive character. Against this backdrop, the government still expects the US to commit on NATO article 5, and that transatlantic disagreements and tensions can and should be managed and mitigated.

Rome has taken a cautious approach on the implications of the US administration’s shifting Ukrainian policy, and is sceptical about the idea of a European military operation in Ukraine to guarantee a peace deal.

The cohesion of the Western camp is explicitly the overarching goal of the prime minister, in line with the traditional Italian balance between Atlanticism and Europeanism (and the enlarged Mediterranean). Accordingly, Italy has actively participated in meetings and coordinations that have taken place in Europe since late 2024, but wants to keep the Atlantic Alliance as solid as possible, as well as enhancing the European pillar of NATO.

Bilateral defence cooperation with the US will continue on a number of dossiers, but it is not set to be prioritised further. Interestingly, this conservative government places a higher priority on European defence, such as joint investments on military capabilities co-funded by the EU. This comes with a pragmatic focus on replicating cooperation, effectiveness, interoperability, and the best practices from NATO in the EU format by avoiding ideas such as the formation of a European army.

Austria – Helena Quis

While the continent debates how to respond to Washington’s foreign policy manoeuvres, Austria’s main concern has been to secure a stable government. The turbulent coalition-building process has sidelined foreign policy discussions.

However, Austria’s muted response is not just a matter of political distraction. It reflects a deeper reluctance to confront shifting security realities. For decades, Austrian neutrality has been possible, largely because of NATO’s security umbrella. Now, as Europe’s security order shifts, Austria faces a critical choice: continue its strategic ambiguity or face up to geopolitical reality.

The Austrian government has so far avoided taking a clear stance on key issues, including European troop deployments to Ukraine, with public debate largely absent. Meanwhile, FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl, despite not becoming chancellor, secured 28.8% of the vote, ensuring his right wing party’s influence from the opposition.

Known for its pro-Russian stance, the FPÖ has advocated aligning Austria with Hungary and Slovakia within a pro-Russian EU axis, praised Trump’s tough approach to Europe and Ukraine, and opposed any Austrian or EU troop deployments. The party even led a citizens’ petition against such involvement last year. In April, the re-appointed defence minister, Klaudia Tanner, from the conservative ÖVP, will have to address this issue in a parliamentary committee.

Hopefully, this will enliven Austria’s discourse on European security, especially as the scope for special approaches and free-riding narrows. Austria’s new foreign minister, the liberal NEOS party’s Beate Meinl-Reisinger, could provide the impetus for a neutrality debate that has been dormant for decades.

Finland – Tuomas Iso-Markku

Finland has long considered the US commitment to NATO and US presence in Europe as essential for Finnish security. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine markedly strengthened this view. Through its April 2023 entry into NATO, and the signing of a bilateral defence cooperation agreement with the US, Finland has moved closer to Washington than ever before.

Against this backdrop, the rhetoric and actions of the Trump administration have been followed closely in Finland. So far, Finland’s foreign policy leadership has adopted a cautious approach, emphasising that statements coming from Washington should be taken seriously, while still arguing there are no signs of a US withdrawal from NATO.

However, experts and politicians are warning of increased risks regarding the US. Recent events provide a strong rationale for Finland to keep investing in its national defence, deepening military partnerships within and beyond the Nordic-Baltic region, and supporting efforts to increase Europe’s military preparedness.

The most obvious discrepancy between Finland and the Trump administration concerns Ukraine. For Finland, supporting Ukraine is crucial, as it is about defending the basic principles of international law and the European security order – and it is intrinsically linked to Finland’s own security and historical experience.

Despite its strong support, Finland’s stance on sending troops on a European mission to Ukraine remains ambiguous. While it has not been ruled out, the Finnish government has suggested that, as a frontline country, Finland needs to think about its own deterrence and defence first.

France – Louise Souverbie

France has not radically changed its stance on the transatlantic relationship in recent weeks. Without questioning the necessity of alliances, since the 1956 Suez crisis, France has believed it should not depend on anyone to carry out its defence and security policy, and that American and European strategic interests could eventually diverge. The pursuit of strategic autonomy, including maintaining the US as an ally, has always been a structuring element of France’s strategic culture. The country has sought to translate this pursuit at the European level.

Yet French authorities have not rushed to complete the transatlantic separation after Trump’s blows – on the contrary, in fact. During his February visit to Washington, President Emmanuel Macron sought to convince Trump it was in his interest to work with Europeans. In a national address on 5 March, Macron had to acknowledge that Washington switched sides over the war in Ukraine, but he continued to refer to the US as an “ally” in recent statements.

While reaffirming attachment to NATO – which must remain a useful tool for organising collective security in Europe – and to the transatlantic partnership, he stressed the need for Europe to strengthen its independence.

As a result, France has taken the lead with other partners to organise the continent’s security and sustained support for Ukraine. French authorities do not plan to send troops before the war ends, but are considering deploying forces post-conflict to guarantee Ukraine’s security, in coordination with allies. Paris is already working with London on such a plan, including hosting a meeting of the chiefs of defence of countries “willing to take responsibility”.

Lithuania – Margarita Šešelgytė

Following President Donald Trump’s January 2025 inauguration, Lithuania has maintained its core defence policy, focusing on national capability development and reliance on NATO’s collective defence framework.

However, strategic steps have been taken to secure continued US interest in the region. Recognising the significance of a strong transatlantic alliance, Lithuania has committed to a substantial increase in defence expenditure. The State Defence Council has announced plans to allocate between five percent and six percent of GDP to defence from 2026 to 2030, making Lithuania the first NATO member to meet Trump’s increased defence spending target.

Furthermore, the Minister of Defence and a delegation of Lithuanian parliamentarians recently conducted an official visit to the US. During this visit, Lithuanian Defence Minister Dovilė Šakalienė engaged with US officials, think tanks and defence industry representatives. Šakalienė announced that US defence companies plan to invest in Lithuania, a move expected to enhance national defence capabilities and strengthen strategic bilateral cooperation.

Lithuania is reaffirming its commitment to the transatlantic partnership, while simultaneously increasing support for European security initiatives. President Gitanas Nausėda has emphasised the need for equitable burden-sharing within NATO, aligning with Trump’s defence contribution concerns.

Nausėda has advocated for a substantial increase in European defence investment to ensure collective security. Additionally, Lithuania has expressed willingness to participate in a European mission to Ukraine if formally requested by Kyiv.

Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys confirmed that Lithuania will consult with its allies regarding the feasibility of such involvement, reinforcing its role as a proactive security actor. Moreover, Budrys has endorsed the idea of a European “nuclear umbrella” as part of broader regional security efforts.

Poland – Marcin Terlikowski

Poland approaches the second Trump administration with concern and a steadfast attachment to NATO and the value of American engagement in European security. In public debate and in diplomacy at the highest level, Poland attempts to show Trump NATO’s value for America, while fully recognising the validity of US calls to shift the burden of common defence more to the European side.

Poland aims to lead by example – it increased defence spending to a historical high of 4.7 percent of GDP in 2025, while pursuing an ambitious armed forces technical modernisation programme.

Holding the EU Presidency in the first half of 2025, Poland animated the historic decisions regarding a new financial envelope for European defence – the adoption of the REARM Europe plan. At the same time, Poland stresses that all EU efforts should be strictly seen as a way of improving burden-sharing in NATO, so the US can remain a credible security guarantor for Europe. Poland approaches French proposals regarding so-called Europeanisation of its national force de frappe with the same logic.

The deployment of Polish troops to Ukraine has been officially discarded on numerous occasions. Regardless of the fact, that at the time of writing, there is no debate in Europe on the format, mandate or size of the potential multinational contingent in Ukraine, Poland asserts that its operational role at NATO’s Eastern Flank precludes any larger deployment abroad.

It is argued in Poland that any force consisting of troops from NATO countries – particularly if there were no Americans engaged – would be an easy target for Russian grey zone/hybrid operations. Such operations could get out of control and give Russia a pretext to a horizontal escalation along the entire Eastern flank.

It is not self-evident if potential deployment in Ukraine would fit the current generation of NATO operational plans. A negative answer in this regard would likely mean a diminished credibility of allied defence and deterrence towards Russia.

Czechia – Lukáš Dyčka

In early 2025, Czech politics has been shaped by a gradually heating campaign in the lead-up to the autumn elections. This means the topic of transatlantic security relations must be seen in this light. Generally speaking, the incumbent coalition is sceptical towards Trump and perceives his behaviour as dangerously destabilising for European security. The prime minister says that the “steps of US president will not contribute to reaching stable peace”, while “the world order is currently undergoing the biggest change since the fall of communism.”

There is noticeable disillusionment with the USA within liberal parts of the society, which is felt emotionally. Equally, there are real steps towards increasing the defence budget, but unlike several other EU countries, this is not done to increase European autonomy. Instead, it is motivated by efforts to keep the US interested in Europe.

As for members of the parliamentary opposition with the highest chances of winning the election, there is a noticeable tendency to criticise increased defence budgets and major procurement programmes, but without taking any specific strong stance on transatlantic security challenges.

The Czech government and military leadership consistently avoid the topic of providing troops to a European mission in Ukraine. The general response points to the prematurity of such discussions before a peace deal is achieved.

About the authors

Torben Schütz is Senior Expert for European Security Policy at the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Tony Lawrence is the Head of the Defence Policy & Strategy Programme and a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security

Jozef Hrabina is the Founder of GeopoLytics

Antonis Kamaras is a Research Associate at the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

Srecko Latal is an Independent Analyst

Calle Håkansson is a Researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency & Associated Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Yordan Bozhilov is the Founder and President of the Sofia Security Forum

Lotje Boswinkel is a PhD researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS)

Jelena Juvan is Assistant Professor at the Chair of Defence Studies, University of Ljubljana

Félix Arteaga is Senior Analyst at the Real Instituto Elcano

Felipe Pathé Duarte is Assistant Professor and researcher at the NOVA School of Law and ISCPSI.

Iztok Bojovic is an Independent Analyst

Claudiu Degeratu is an Associate Expert at Global Focus Center ROMANIA

Paal Sigurd Hilde is Associate Professor and Head of Section for Norwegian Security Policy at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS)

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen is a Professor at Copenhagen University

Tamas Csiki is Senior Research Fellow at the John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics

Sine Özkarasahin is a Junior Associate Fellow at the NATO Defense College

Alessandro Marrone is is Head of the Defence, Security and Sspace Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali

Iztok Bojovic is an Independent Analyst

Helena Quis is a Project Manager in the Europe’s Future program at Bertelsmann Stiftung

Tuomas Iso-Markku is a Senior Research Fellow in the European Union and Strategic Competition research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)

Louise Souverbie is a Research Fellow at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS)

Prof. Margarita Šešelgytė is the Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University.

Marcin Terlikowski, PhD is head of the Research Office at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).

Lukáš Dyčka, PhD is Head of Department of Courses Management at the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies (CSMSS) at the Czech University of Defence.

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Untangling the Transatlantic Incentive Trap: Europe’s Plan and America’s Contribution

European Defence and Trump: Strategic Calculations and Potential Compromises

Europe Reacts to Trump: What to Expect in Security and Defence Policy – Global & European Dynamics

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