As Donald Trump begins his second presidential term, transatlantic security debates once again revolve around US pressure on Europe to boost defence spending. However, Trump’s escalating demands risk overshadowing the fundamental issue: the US-enforced transatlantic incentive structure which reinforces Europe’s ongoing security dependence and ultimately benefits neither side in today’s global geopolitical context. Recognizing the pivotal role US policy plays in shaping the future of European security, Europe must advocate for structural reforms that reduce its reliance on the US and compel Washington to reconsider its contradictory position: demanding more from Europe while obstructing European defence initiatives. If not for the sake of European security, this shift is crucial to maintaining US influence in an increasingly hostile world.

A legacy of dependence

The US dominance over European security, a legacy of Cold War dynamics, persists through industrial dominance, the provision of key defence enablers, and operational control. Despite repeated calls for a stronger European defence capability, Washington has consistently opposed initiatives that would diminish its influence, adhering to former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s “three Ds”: don’t duplicate, don’t discriminate, don’t disconnect.

However, the contradiction of demanding greater contributions from Europe while denying it strategic autonomy has become increasingly untenable. As the US shifts its focus to the Indo-Pacific, a more capable and independent Europe would not only enhance regional stability and prevent Europe from being forced to reconfigure relations with Russia and China, but also align with long-term US interests by sharing global security responsibilities.

The Transatlantic incentive structure: What keeps Europe dependent

US cooperation remains essential for any lasting change, because the problem of weak European defence is not solely Europe’s to solve. This particularly concerns the transatlantic incentive structure that currently keeps Europe dependent on the US in production and capabilities and can only be rebalanced with active US involvement and concessions.

The defence-industry relationship

Europe’s defence industrial dependency on the US results from a blend of varying industrial capability portfolios, non-tangible effects of armament imports, regulatory barriers, financial incentives and political environments.

The US Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) remains more capable than its European (and other global) counterparts in several equipment categories, most prominently in modern combat aircraft as exemplified by the F-35 that will enter service with at least 14 European air forces.

This leaves European forces, who have generally adopted the US armed forces’ claim to always seek technological superiority on the battlefield, few choices as domestic development of equivalent weapon systems will take time and might prove prohibitively expensive.

Importing weapon systems from any nation solidifies a defence relationship that is likely to endure over the operational lifetime of the equipment. Financial incentives contribute to the attractiveness and entrenchment of this relation and the resulting dependence.

Programs like the European Recapitalization Incentive Programme (ERIP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) encourage European countries to procure US equipment by offering subsidies and favourable financing. While these initiatives support immediate military readiness, they discourage long-term investment in European defence manufacturing.

Lastly, the Buy American Act and related protectionist measures further limit European market access while the US simultaneously criticizes European initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

These conflicting policies discourage Europe from developing an autonomous Defence DTIB. Continued US opposition, including during the Trump 1.0 administration, further exacerbates the challenge by openly undermining European efforts toward more defence autonomy.

Capabilities and operational dependence

Beyond industrial dependency, Europe remains operationally reliant on US critical enablers like strategic airlift, aerial refuelling, and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) systems.

Additionally, considering a European contingency would also require a steady stream of spare parts and munitions for US-made systems to Europe, another dependency with significant operational impact.

NATO’s command structure, heavily reliant on US assets, has further discouraged independent European capability development. The path dependency from US involvement in the European security architecture reduces incentives for European nations to invest in autonomous strategic enablers. Both NATO and bilateral links between US and European armed forces also impact doctrine development, in which most European are striving to follow temporary US concepts such as Multi-Domain Operations (MDO).

From transactional to transformative cooperation

The US has long urged European allies to spend more on defence but has lacked a coherent strategy to align shared security goals. Trump’s return to office is unlikely to alleviate this. Therefore, Europe must take the initiative by presenting Washington with a strategic defence transformation plan to strengthens Europe’s capabilities while reinforcing transatlantic cooperation.

Rather than focusing on transactional defence arrangements, Europe and the US should pursue a long-term, unified security strategy. Europe must persuade Washington that a more capable European defence partner aligns with US interests, particularly as Washington shifts its strategic focus towards the Indo-Pacific and is at the same time confronted with declining relative power.

Core elements of a long-term strategic transformation

  1. Rebalancing the industrial relationship:

Supply chain problems and capacity constraints are two of the major challenges both the US and European DTIBs face. This has both to do with a more antagonistic China (see sanctioning of US defence companies), but also with calculated material consumption rates for high-intensity peer-to-peer conflicts.

To address this, ensuring the supply of necessary resources and components along the production process as well as a broader manufacturing base are two critical remedies, especially in times when industry is straining and domestic expansion is difficult. While drawing away jobs and investment from the US is a hard sell, it is a clear strategic trade-off away from supply concentration and towards more resilience.

Ally- or friendshoring licensed production for certain products and munitions that are already being procured by Europeans could thus help the US prioritize its Indo-Pacific allies for their own production now and provide extra capacity in a crisis. The emerging Patriot-interceptor production in Europe offers a first blueprint.

To reduce dependencies, both sides must prioritize cooperation over competition in the defence-industrial space. Europe must modernize its armed forces and close capability gaps, particularly in emerging technologies. Platforms like the EU-US Trade and Technology Council and initiatives like DIANA and PESCO can facilitate this collaboration if paired with reciprocal market access reforms.

Both the US and European states should acknowledge the EU’s potential as a key actor in fostering a capable European defence industrial pillar if it uses its financial and regulatory power to incentivise a compatible industrial landscape (e.g. ASAP’s effect on supply chains).

  1. Enhancing operational capabilities

Supporting European and transatlantic defence industrial cooperation would already help strengthen certain capabilities and alleviate some dependency on munitions and spare parts, but NATO’s defence planning process offers a strategic opportunity to shift more responsibility onto Europe.

One proposal suggests Europe should meet at least 50% of NATO’s minimum capability requirements by the end of the decade, with fully operational forces capable of independent crisis management. Achieving this would require greater investment in strategic capabilities and readiness while avoiding the sensitive issue of US primacy in NATO’s command structure.

Reviving the unused Berlin Plus arrangements, with a European Deputy SACEUR overseeing EU-led missions, could clarify operational leadership without undermining transatlantic cohesion. Ultimately, it would fall to Europeans to meet transatlantic goals by aligning national strengths through coordinated European capability planning congruent with NATO’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

  1. A transatlantic strategic dialogue

European NATO members should push for a structured, high-level transatlantic dialogue on burden-sharing that goes beyond financial commitments and emphasises shared strategic objectives. Involving the EU in such a dialogue would not only demonstrate Europe’s willingness to use all available instruments in a holistic approach but could also help reduce US scepticism about EU defence initiatives by making their objectives more transparent and embedding them in a strategic transatlantic framework.

A permanent forum for aligning NATO and EU strategies on capability development, industrial cooperation and operational planning would address Europe’s defence shortfalls – challenges that cannot be solved by national efforts, NATO instruments or defence spending targets alone – while ensuring that both sides’ security needs are met and NATO’s core objectives are upheld.

Recommendations: Immediate and mid-term actions

Europe must make it clear to the new Trump administration that neither abrupt actions nor indefinite postponements serve transatlantic interests. Transforming the partnership requires a strategic, long-term approach for which Europe must now set out clear European positions, measurable milestones and a concrete timeline.

The March 2025 European Council meeting offers an important first opportunity to establish a political foundation that simultaneously reflects European priorities and sends a signal of commitment to Washington.

Building on the above long-term elements, the following recommendations outline key next steps for Europe to pursue in both the short and medium term.

Short Term:

  1. Ukraine: Leverage continued European support for Ukraine to drive demand for US defence suppliers in critical capabilities, aligning shared security interests with industrial cooperation.
  2. Industrial investment: Announce direct EU investment, similar to ASAP, to establish licensed production of US defence systems and munitions in Europe, reducing dependency while supporting US industrial interests.
  3. Institutional framework: Leverage the NATO-Industry Forum and the EU-US TTC framework as existing transatlantic platforms to coordinate necessary adjustments to the transatlantic industrial incentive structure.

Medium Term:

  1. Capability alignment: Match European demands for critical enablers (e.g., C4ISR) with available US systems, ensuring both interoperability and US market incentives.
  2. Operational leadership shift: Begin a gradual transfer of operational responsibility by expanding European leadership within NATO’s command structure. A future mission focused on stabilising Ukraine and deterring Russia could serve as a pilot for greater EU operational control, potentially reviving a modernized Berlin Plus framework.

Ultimately, Europe must articulate a clear, unified vision of how its enhanced strategic responsibility benefits the alliance as a whole. A stronger, more autonomous Europe would not weaken NATO but would instead reinforce transatlantic security by sharing the burden more equitably.

At the same time, it seems clear that in the current geopolitical circumstances, the US can no longer have it both ways: maintain its indispensable role and benefit from strong European allies or expect Europeans to pay more without having more say in European security.

About the authors

Helena Quis is Project Manager in the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Europe Programme, focusing on European security and defence cooperation, with a special emphasis on building comprehensive preparedness and expertise in EU-UK relations.

Torben Schütz is Senior Expert for European Security Policy at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. His work focuses on German and European security and defence policy, as well as military capabilities and defence industrial issues.

Read more about transatlantic security cooperation

Europe Reacts to Trump: What to Expect in Security and Defence Policy – Global & European Dynamics

Related Posts: