Initially, President Joe Biden’s administration did not plan to closely engage with the problems surrounding Israel and the region. But the situation developed in a different direction. The US is now involved in numerous confrontations between Israel and its regional neighbours, which suddenly shifted from a state of simmering conflicts to acute escalation since war in Gaza broke out.

The US administration is playing a leading role in negotiations over the Israeli hostages held in Gaza since 7 October and on the northern border between Israel and Lebanon. As Houthi drone attacks on Israel from Yemen become increasingly threatening, the US military has stepped up its defence on that front.

On 13 April, when numerous missiles and drones rained down on Israel from Iran, cooperation with the US and other states in the region acted as life insurance for Israel. And even now, after the killing of the political chief of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, it is US diplomatic skills – and ultimately its military support for Israel – that will be decisive in determining the extent of the escalation.

This shows that the US administration under Biden is making a major contribution to Israeli security, which has been more destabilised externally and internally since October 2023 than at any time since its creation. The already enormous military aid to Israel has been further increased since the war in Gaza and will provisionally amount to US$12.5 billion for the year 2024.

Indeed, Biden, who calls himself a “Zionist”, seems to have a weak spot for Israel. His commitment goes beyond traditional US solidarity with Israel and seems personal.

Yet despite intensive cooperation on an institutional and military level, Israeli-American relations are experiencing a crisis that has been manifesting itself for months. Tensions between the White House and Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israeli government have heightened. The lack of strategy in the Israeli war in Gaza and the disastrous humanitarian situation regularly frustrates the US administration.

Discord between Netanyahu and the White House

Additionally, the extreme right-wing Israeli government continues to push ahead with annexation in the occupied West Bank.

When Israel announced new settlements in the areas, the largest expansion since the Oslo Accords, as well as legalising outposts on private Palestinian land that were previously illegal even under Israeli law, the US reacted with sanctions. These sanctions were directed against individual settlers and, in accordance with America’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen), provide for fines for banks if financial transactions in connection with any West Bank outposts take place.

This means the Biden administration has taken a measure that is linked not only to individuals but to territoriality, making it a punishment of the settlement enterprise as such. Since Bezalel Smotrich, the leader of the national-religious party in the Knesset, has been responsible for the civil administration of the West Bank, including building permits, annexation of the territories has progressed rapidly.

Washington’s measures are a signal to the Israeli government, which is closely linked to the settlement project. Previously, in February 2023, Biden reversed the Trump administration’s policy that Israeli settlements are legitimate and returned to the recognised definition under international law.

Further domestic developments in Israel are undermining American efforts to shield Israel from criticism by international organisations and widespread global public opinion.

On 18 July, the Knesset passed a resolution that it “firmly opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River”. This is, among other things, a reaction to the worldwide wave of recognition of Palestine, including three European states, Ireland, Spain and Norway.

According to the resolution, the rejection of a future Palestinian state is unconditional. Therefore, the Israeli leadership is undermining its own most important argument and the argument of its allies, above all the US, as well as European states, according to which the prospect of the emergence of a Palestinian state alongside with Israel is currently an unviable option, as there is no “partner for peace” among Palestinian stakeholders and that it is the Palestinian side that rejects any advances and concessions from Israel, not the other way around.

Of all the opposition parties, only the Arab parties voted against the resolution. Most others abstained and the party of Netanyahu’s rival Benny Gantz even voted in favour. Netanyahu was absent from the vote.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) assessment, published the next day, confirmed that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is illegal. This reads all the more justified in combination with the Knesset resolution. An occupation can certainly be legal in the sense of international law as long as it is limited in time.

However, ICJ judges concluded that Israel’s actions are intended to be permanent. The US has protested against the decision, but with the Israeli parliament stating it is not interested in two states and negotiations, the US argument that the ruling is inconsistent with the established framework of the peace process is no longer convincing.

The resolution is also problematic in light of the ongoing negotiations between the US and Saudi Arabia on a deal that should include normalisation with Israel. For reasons of its own regional political credibility, Saudi Arabia is insisting that Israel signal concessions to the Palestinians – and that the deal be passed as a treaty in the US Senate with at least 67 votes, so it cannot be reversed under a future president.

The necessary votes of the Democratic senators are tied to the Israeli government at least verbally declaring itself open to future negotiations with the Palestinians. Not only is time running out to do a deal before the US elections, it became clear during Netanyahu’s speech to Congress on 24 July that he is not willing to speak about peace and a perspective for Palestinians, even in the vaguest terms.

Nor was he ready to speak about concrete steps towards the hostage deal. The release of the 115 remaining hostages in Gaza, including eight with US citizenship, is a major concern of the US administration – and almost a personal mission for Biden. It is not clear how many hostages are still alive, but it is certain that the number is shrinking as time goes on.

Just like the talks with Saudi Arabia, Netanyahu is cautious about making binding statements. This is because his national-religious coalition partners would break away as soon as Netanyahu spoke about Palestinian statehood or ending the war in Gaza in favour of freeing hostages. A permanent ceasefire is a Hamas condition. In the eyes of ultra-right coalition partners, this – and an exchange of Palestinian prisoners for hostages – would mean defeat.

Netanyahu, whose poll ratings are dramatic – 70 percent want him to resign – sees maintaining the governing coalition as a recipe for maintaining his own power, at least as long as new elections seem unfavourable to him and would end his political career.

In June, Biden told Time magazine there was every reason to believe Netanyahu wanted to prolong the war for his own political self-preservation. The killing of Ismail Haniyeh was also “not helpful” in freeing the hostages, according to Biden. Since then, negotiations have been frozen by Hamas.

Netanyahu’s speech to Congress

Against the backdrop of the looming escalation – Iran had already announced a reaction after the killing took place in Tehran, where Haniyeh was staying as a state guest for the inauguration of new Iranian President Pezeshkian – Netanyahu’s speech to Congress reads particularly forward-looking in retrospect.

The visit to Washington was Netanyahu’s first during this term in office. He waited in vain for an invitation in the first year after the election, which was characterised by the attempted judiciary reform and massive protests of the democracy movement in Israel. This summer’s visit was at the invitation of Republican Party representatives.

Amid public dissent between Netanyahu and the White House – and the polarisation of the Democratic Party and its voters over Israel and the war in Gaza – the invitation appeared to be an opportunity to show up the Democrats during the election campaign. In fact, Israel is no longer a bipartisan issue. Increasing number of Democrats question the long-standing consensus in support of Israel. As expected, Netanyahu’s visit was accompanied by several calls for a boycott and protests inside and outside the Congress building.

The visit was criticised in Israel too. The fact that Netanyahu left the country for a week in the middle of a war, just before the Knesset’s summer recess, reinforced the perception, prevalent since 7 October that he is running away from political responsibility. When it became clear during the visit that a hostage deal is not a priority, disappointment became more pronounced.

His speech to Congress seemed to many listeners to be a complete disconnect from Israel’s reality. Netanyahu tried to shift the focus from the actual war in Gaza to the general regional threat posed by Iran, ultimately portraying it as a global threat, especially to the US.

According to his logic, the Israeli war in Gaza is a service to all Western civilisation, making Israel indispensable to a stable Middle East and moral world order. Should Israel lose this war, it means “America is next” according to Netanyahu. He used several WWII comparisons to convince Congress, whose members regularly burst into rapturous applause, that this war is a shared historical event.

Netanyahu was paraphrasing Winston Churchill’s famous quote from his December 1941 speech, when he called on the lawmakers to “give us the tools faster, and we’ll finish the job faster”. With this, Netanyahu indirectly addressed the accusation that the ongoing war in Gaza was taking too long and criticised the US administration for withholding 2,000-pound bombs.

The fact that Netanyahu surpassed his idol Winston Churchill by being allowed to address Congress four times – the highest number for a foreign head of state – is a source of pride that he mentioned on multiple occasions.

Iran, as “the root of all evil”, has been a constant motif of his speeches, using this rhetoric again in Washington in an attempt to secure American support. Hardly anyone expected it to become so relevant just a few days later. Even the US administration was taken by surprise. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced immediately after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh that they had not been in the loop.

Israel’s northern border has been tense for months. More than 80,000 Israelis have been evacuated from their homes. There have been discussions within the Israeli security apparatus for months that a controlled escalation by Israel against Hezbollah would help resolve the situation.

An Iranian attack, for which Israel is preparing now, would involve Hezbollah, whose high-ranking commander Fuad Shukr was killed in Beirut just one day before Haniyeh.

The killing spree caused Netanyahu’s poll ratings to rise for the first time in months. He must have gained confidence during his visit to the USA that his actions have sufficient support and concluded that President Biden’s help is secure until the next election. After that, the window of opportunity could close. However, in a phone call on 1 August, Biden warned that support would be withdrawn if Israel took further uncoordinated action.

Perceptions of presidential candidates Trump and Harris

Netanyahu’s visit served as a gauge of the presidential candidates, as he met with Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Trump received him at his residence in Mar-a-lago. The two politicians had not spoken for more than three years after Netanyahu congratulated Biden on his presidency five days after the election. In a 2021 interview with Axios, Trump railed against Bibi’s disloyalty, adding that he had done more for Israel than any other president.

Trump is angered by the so-called Jewish vote too. The majority of Jewish Americans traditionally favour the Democratic Party, with 68 percent voting for Biden. For Trump, this means that they “hate Israel and their religion”.

In contrast, Trump has a large Israeli supporter base. Many of his actions in office are not forgotten, having upset longstanding certainties in the Middle East. These include recognising Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and the annexed Golan Heights as Israeli territory.

Additionally, the 2020 Abraham Accords and the peace plan presented that year, known as the “Deal of the Century”, followed the Netanyahu government’s wishes at the time and left Palestinians out of the equation. Since then, the Trump administration’s generous gifts have been overtaken by the reality of the conflict. He envisaged limited statehood for Palestinians and a Palestinian capital in Abu Dis, an area that was approved for settlement construction in Israel last year.

To build on what the Israeli government sees as good cooperation, Netanyahu used his time with Trump to smooth things over. But for months now, Trump’s statements towards Israel can no longer be seen as merely supportive. The Republican platform states that “we will stand with Israel”, but it is impossible to predict what this means in concrete terms, especially if active military support is required. This is the case under Biden.

There is still no statement from Trump about whether he would continue to support the annual $3 billion weapons package for Israel. Like Biden and Harris, he has repeatedly spoken out in favour of ending the Gaza war as quickly as possible, echoing voter sentiment.

The non-interventionist stance would benefit Netanyahu’s national-religious partners. Trump is popular with Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, who publicly support his return to the White House because they do not expect him to interfere with their annexationist and expansionist agenda.

Unlike Trump, Harris has no record on Israel. As it is customary for mainstream Democrats, she supports a two-state solution and Israel’s right to self-defence. However, it is unclear what her actual stance on Israel will be. There are two parallel assessments.

On the one hand, she is expected to continue Biden’s line. Although her rhetoric on Israel is a little more critical – and she addresses Palestinian concerns in public statements – some believe the differences will remain only verbal.

After all, the same political constraints will still apply. Moreover, as a member of the administration, she has supported the decisions made to date. Rhetorical differences are a result of framing, partly due to Harris and Biden representing different political generations.

On the other hand, progressive voters and parts of the Democratic Party hope she will be tougher on Israel than Biden, because of her rhetoric. Harris was one of the first to call for a ceasefire in Gaza in March. This interpretation is widespread in Israel, where the fact that Harris’ policy towards Israel is still unknown tends to cause concern. Her absence from Netanyahu’s speech in Congress attracted negative attention.

But the question of who will head the next Israeli government will be important for US-Israeli relations too. Even though Netanyahu appears to be firmly in the driver’s seat with a coalition of 64 Knesset members, the next regular elections are scheduled for 2026.

For the EU, the next US president is important for its own relations with Israel insofar as the EU likes to align with White House policy. For example, the EU, although largely more critical of Israel, only imposed sanctions against settlers in the West Bank after the US first put forward the option. The strategy of letting the US take the lead has to do with the fear of making oneself vulnerable.

Individual European states are very divided in their attitude towards Israel. The trend is expected to continue as long as the occupation exists, accompanied by violent escalations. If Trump becomes US president again, it is expected that this polarisation will receive an additional boost.

About the author

Lidia Averbukh is Project Manager at the Bertelsmann Stiftung and heads the German-Israeli Young Leaders exchange. She previously served as a program manager at the European Leadership Network (ELNET) and as a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). Lidia earned her doctorate on the Israeli legal system from the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich.

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