Transatlantic Trends is a project co-led by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the Bertelsmann Foundation (North America), Inc. The 2022 edition presents the results of surveys conducted in 14 countries from all corners of the transatlantic community: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Polling was conducted between June and July 2022.

With the release of Transatlantic Trends 2022, in this blog post, we share five of the most important insights.

1. US influence is perceived as high today but is expected to decline in the next five years in favor of Chinese influence.

The United States is currently perceived as the most influential power in global affairs (64%), followed by the European Union (17%), China (13%), and Russia (6%). Americans are the most likely to find the US influential (86%), a sentiment not shared as enthusiastically in all other countries surveyed.

On average, 62% of Europeans find the US to be most influential, with the highest such figures recorded in Portugal (67%), Poland (67%), and Lithuania (66%). Respondents in the Netherlands (59%), France (59%), and Italy (56%) are the least likely to share the same view.While American influence is perceived as high today, respondents on both sides of the Atlantic anticipate Washington’s influence will decline significantly in the next five years. Specifically, 37% of all respondents expect the US will be the most influential global power in 2027, a drop of 27 percentage points.

US influence is expected to decline in favor of Chinese influence, which respondents anticipate will nearly double (13% to 25%) in the next five years.

2. Climate change and the ongoing war in Ukraine are considered the most pressing security challenges.

Climate change is considered the most important security challenge, a trend consistent with the results recorded in 2021 and 2020 (18%). Still, Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine has resonated with publics on both sides of the Atlantic, as a “war between countries” (18%) and “Russia” (17%) round out the top three security challenges.

Italian (34%), French (28%), and Canadian (24%) respondents clearly prioritize climate change, whereas pluralities in Spain and Portugal that choose interstate war and Russia, cumulatively, slightly outrank those who indicate climate change.

Geography plays an important role in perceptions of the most important security challenge, as countries closer to Ukraine clearly choose interstate war and Russia: 42% for Russia and 27% for interstate war among Lithuanians, 35% and 25% among Poles, and 18% and 27% among Romanians respectively.

In Germany, 22% of respondents indicate war between countries and 21% choose Russia, whereas 20% select climate change. In 2021, Germans were the most likely of respondents in any country to indicate climate change as being the most important security challenge (29%).

In the US, Americans have a multipolar view of the security landscape with nearly equal results among climate change (14%), interstate war (13%), immigration (11%), and Russia (10%), while in Türkiye, immigration is clearly considered the most important security challenge at 37%.

3. NATO’s stock is rising, while Europeans also wish to retain US involvement in European defense and security.

The security threats created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have accompanied rising public support for NATO and US military involvement in Europe. The number of respondents who perceive NATO as important has increased over the past year from 67% in 2021 to 78% today.

NATO is considered important, especially in central and eastern Europe among Poles (91%), Romanians (88%) and Lithuanians (87%). Similarly, those who support US involvement in European defense and security have increased since last year from 60% to 72%. Support is also highest among the same countries.

Since 2021, the number of respondents who see NATO as important has increased from 52% to 72% in France and from 56% to 70% in Sweden. Furthermore, majorities in all countries, except Türkiye, also support the expansion of NATO to include Sweden and Finland (73%).

Despite overall support for NATO and US military involvement in the defense of Europe, 81% of European respondents, including the United Kingdom and Türkiye, also believe the European Union plays an important role in their country’s national security.

4. European respondents prefer working through the EU to manage relations with China, while Americans also favor working multilaterally to engage Beijing.

Respondents of countries belonging to the European Union have a clear preference for working through the EU to manage relations with China over working with other Asian countries, working unilaterally, or working with the United States. Portuguese (67%), Spanish (58%), and Swedish (50%) respondents were most likely to believe their countries should primarily work through the EU to engage Beijing.

Romania is the main EU outlier, as respondents are split between working through the EU (33%) and pursuing an independent approach (27%). Similarly, despite exiting the European Union, UK respondents are split between working through Brussels (27%) and engaging China unilaterally (24%). Türkiye is another outlier, with a majority of 56% preferring to engage China alone.

Americans prefer to work multilaterally to engage China, either with the European Union (23%) or with countries in the region (24%). Still, a quarter of Americans prefer a unilateral approach. On the other hand, only 9% and 11% of respondents across all countries favor working with the US to manage relations with China respectively.

5. There is no appetite for intervening militarily in Taiwan in the case of a Chinese invasion, with respondents favoring diplomatic actions and joint sanctions.

In the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, respondents on both sides of the Atlantic prefer either working only through diplomatic channels to end the conflict (35%) or joining other countries to impose sanctions on Beijing (32%).

On the other hand, an average of just 4% support sending arms to Taiwan, and 2% favor sending troops. Support for these actions is highest among Americans, albeit amounting to 8% and 7%, respectively. Overall, 12% of all respondents favor taking no action, with the percentage highest in Romania (24%).Turks (45%), Romanians (45%), and Italians (44%) are the most likely to believe their countries should work only diplomatically to end the conflict. Support for this action is lowest among Dutch (27%), US (26%), and Canadian (26%) respondents who instead prefer using sanctions.

Respondents in the UK (40%), Portugal (40%), Canada (39%), and Germany (39%) are the most likely to support imposing sanctions on China in the case of an invasion. Romania, Türkiye, and Italy, all countries belonging to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, are the least likely to support sanctions (18%, 15%, and 21%, respectively). Romania and Türkiye were also the two countries least likely to support taking a tougher approach with China regardless of the economic impact.

In conclusion, the results of Transatlantic Trends 2022 – shown here in just a spotlight – reflect a shifting and, in some cases, volatile geopolitical environment. The challenges of today, especially Russia’s war in Ukraine, have increased the value placed on transatlantic cooperation. Publics on both sides of the Atlantic largely share common concerns on issues impacting the greater community.

Still, the geopolitical threats of tomorrow could also shake up the status quo. Waning American influence among Europeans, growing regard for the specific role the EU plays in international affairs, and the lack of a  consensus for a transatlantic approach toward China reveal shifting preferences within the alliance.

To read the full report, please click here.

About the author

Brandon Bohrn works as a project manager for the “Europe’s Future” program at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Currently, he is working to organize the inaugural U.S.-German Futures Forum, focused on promoting German-American cooperation in democracy and technology.