Donald Trump is going back to the White House. As expected, close races across seven key battleground states – Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nevada and Arizona – were decisive. Unexpected was a clean sweep for Trump, who is projected to win every single one, flipping Biden majorities by tens to hundreds of thousands of votes. Across the country, Trump dramatically outperformed his 2020 results. It is clear Trump’s message resonated with American voters.

Beyond the race for the White House, the Senate also went Republican. The GOP flipped seats in Ohio, Montana and West Virginia to win a slim majority, which may grow still. The tally for the House of Representatives is still not final, but the Republicans have a good chance of keeping their existing lead.

As Trump prepares his transition, there are questions about who will fill his cabinet. Many members of his last administration endorsed Kamala Harris, while new allies, Robert Kennedy Jr and Elon Musk for example, are banking on active roles.

During his campaign, Trump threatened to punish his political opponents and silence critical media outlets. If he follows up on this rhetoric, it will be a difficult test for US democracy. He also promised to crack down on immigration, apply blanket tariffs to imports, radically cut government spending and reduce support for Ukraine to push Moscow and Kyiv towards a peace deal.

For Europe, memories of Trump’s damaging first presidency are suddenly a very real future again. Trump’s fondness for Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping – and his eagerness to antagonise European leaders outside of a few kindred spirits – put the EU on notice. His second presidency will have far-reaching, disruptive effects and European leaders should prepare urgently. Looking ahead, our experts preview what could occur in select policy areas and international dynamics.

Trump 2.0 may weaken NATO and European security

Trump’s return to the White House poses profound challenges for Europe and Germany, especially concerning security and support for Ukraine. Trump has repeatedly voiced his disdain for NATO, questioned the role of the US as a protective power and sharply criticised Europeans, particularly Germany, for low defence spending. He has repeatedly threatened to restrict US involvement in NATO and questioned the US commitment to collective defence under Article 5.

While a complete U.S. withdrawal from NATO is unlikely, a second Trump administration could significantly weaken the American pillar of the alliance by reducing the number of conventional US forces in Europe, limiting cooperation on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or even ending US nuclear deterrence.

NATO allies will likely be pressured not only to meet but to exceed the two percent defence spending commitment reaffirmed at the 2023 Vilnius summit. Germany, in particular, which has been a focus of Trump’s criticism since 2016, would come under enormous pressure if it failed to meet these targets.

Against this backdrop, it would make sense for Europe to not only emphasize but to build on the progress made in defence spending over recent years (22 of the 30 European NATO members have now reached the two percent defence spending target) and set even more ambitious goals for the next five to ten years. A certain share of the increased defence efforts could also be realized through the purchase of American weapon systems.

While The EU is nervous, Ukraine is afraid – survival is at stake

Soon after the result was clear, President Zelenskyy congratulated Donald Trump on his “impressive election victory”. From the perspective of a people in survival mode, it is clear why common ground might be sought. Despite Ukrainian resilience, the war is going badly. This is partly because the Russian war economy is functioning well and supported by so-called Autocracy, Inc.

The Trump presidency might reverse US sanctions on Russia. Additionally, the Senate may put support for Ukraine at risk. If support diminishes, Ukraine would be under pressure to end the war through painful or even devastating compromises, without robust security guarantees. This would affirm Putin’s violation of international law, leaving Russia as a continued security threat.

Some place hope in Trump’s unpredictability. Perceived as more risk-inclined, Trump might disrupt the approach of ”trial by combat” that has not yet positioned Ukraine to secure a decisive victory. The reality is that Ukraine is being supported in its self-defence, but under restrictions, particularly regarding the use of long-range precision weapons on Russian military targets that are key to attacks on vital infrastructure in Ukraine.

In 2018, under Trump, the US supplied Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles. This marked a policy shift from primarily non-lethal assistance to lethal aid. These missiles played a significant role in Kyiv’s defence in 2022. Some question whether this decision was domestically motivated, given scandals linking Trump’s political campaign to Russia, and caution that placing hope in Trump could be misleading. The fact remains that Trump has never visited Ukraine, despite many invitations.

With the war involving zones of influence – and Iran and North Korea siding with Putin – hope rests on the assumption that a victory over Russia is recognised by Trump and his team as being in their own interest.

Trump could be an opportunity for China in Europe

The US has defined China as its key challenge in the 21st century. This along with a more pronounced focus on the Indo-Pacific would have been at the core of the China policy for Harris or Trump. While Harris would likely have pursued a more predictable, partnership- and alliance-based course here, Trump is known for acting erratically.

Trump 2.0 will be an uncomfortable situation for the stability-driven Chinese leadership. Trump’s threat of tariffs up to 60 percent on all Chinese imports is a serious concern for Beijing. As China’s growth remains export-driven, such a step could seriously affect its already struggling economy.

However, the incoming Trump administration will likely further isolate the US internationally, undermine transatlantic relations, force foreign companies into more US-led export controls and technological de-coupling – and make deals with whomever they see fit, democrats and autocrats alike. This could represent a great opportunity for China to revamp its relations with another important export market – the EU and its member states.

More divide-and-rule tactics, along with Chinese attempts at charm offensives in Europe, should be expected. Beijing will be hoping the EU takes a more pragmatic stance vis-à-vis China under these new auspices.

Trump and the Middle East – between the Nobel Peace Prize and regional radicalisation

Trump is again set to bring movement to the Middle East. During his campaign, he called on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end the wars in Gaza and Lebanon before he officially takes office, while promising his Arab-American voters peace in the Middle East.

Trump’s character craves success, fame, financial income and benefits. His instruments are unpredictable, erratic behaviour and sealing short-term, interest-driven bilateral deals. The three Arab heavyweights, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, are promising.

Trump will want economic benefits and a cooperation agreement with Israel from the Saudi crown prince. In return, Mohammed Bin Salman will want comprehensive security guarantees and a nuclear cooperation programme from Trump. Without a solution to the Palestinian issue, the Saudi royal family will find it difficult to officially normalise relations with Israel.

Trump could firmly remind Netanyahu, who is looking forward to a Republican administration and does not want to share land with the Palestinians, of his Middle East peace plan, Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People. This was signed by Trump in the presence of Netanyahu at the White House in January 2020. It is based on an Israeli-Palestinian two-state model. Although the peace plan was negotiated between Netanyahu and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner without the Palestinians, it could give Trump hope of winning a coveted Nobel Peace Prize.

This could be the direction if Trump again entrusts his son-in-law Kushner with the Middle East portfolio. But if Trump gives this responsibility to his former ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, who is close to the Israeli settler movement and the right-wing spectrum of the Netanyahu government, the Palestinian question could move towards further West Bank annexations and a re-colonisation of the Gaza Strip, ending the possibility of a two-state solution. This would put Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha leaders in a quandary and strengthen radical forces in the Arab world, making it harder to contain Iran’s nuclear and missile ambitions.

UK and EU will find more reasons to deepen ties

The new Trump presidency will undoubtedly impact the UK’s intended reset with both the EU and Europe as a whole, a policy intended to heal the Brexit-induced chasm that now runs through the political West since 2016.

Strong transatlantic relations – and its focus on NATO for security – will remain at the heart of British foreign policy. The UK will work hard to persuade the US of the continuing importance of NATO, while simultaneously encouraging stronger commitment from fellow European members. At the same time, Trump’s wider policies – including trade – and his lack of predictability will add impetus to the UK strategy of deepening bilateral ties with individual European countries, while working towards a security pact and deeper EU trade relations. Trump’s personal love for the UK and dislike of the EU may muddy the waters and tempt the UK into forgetting where its genuine allies are to be found.

In Brussels, US developments will likely reinforce a gradually emerging view that investing in a partnership with a like-minded, resourceful ally on its doorstep has growing value. This may encourage the development of a flexible, third-party partnership model fit for a geopolitical age. The EU-UK summit in spring will be an opportunity to push this agenda forward.

More of the same and then some – Trump 2.0 on trade

Trump’s re-election is a blow to Europe’s struggling economy, especially for exporting industries that are fundamental to EU growth and prosperity. The Biden administration’s subsidy plans for local industries under the Inflation Reduction Act and the Chips and Science Act shocked many in the European trade world, as American interests were openly put above rules-based international competition.

Biden’s policies pale in the face of what is likely to come. Trump’s trade plans are expected to be even more radical and less predictable than his first administration. Alongside 10 percent tariffs on all imports to the US, which will ultimately be paid by American consumers, the EU can expect a return of the infamous steel and aluminium duties. These duties were only temporarily suspended under Biden. The impact of tariffs and duties will be compounded by reduced cooperation on tech regulation and attempts to force the EU to comply with US demands through intense economic pressure.

With the Anti-Coercion Instrument, the EU is equipped to counter those attempts, but it can only do so if member states remain united. This is uncertain given the open Trump supporters in national governments across the EU.

Other consequences are less direct. With the US further closing its markets to Chinese goods, Chinese production overcapacities will be redirected to the EU, increasing the competitive pressure on industries such as electric car manufacturing. This is another wake-up call for the EU to finally implement its own credible industrial strategy.

About the authors

Jake Benford is a member of Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Europe Programme, currently focusing on EU-UK relations.

Brandon Bohrn works as a project manager in the Europe’s Future program. His work centres around U.S.-German and transatlantic relations. Previously, he worked on the transatlantic team at the Bertelsmann Foundation in Washington, D.C.

Nathan Crist is Project Manager in the Europe’s Future Programme at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, working on the Europe’s Economy Project.

Christian Hanelt is Senior Expert for the EU Neighbourhood and the Middle East, working in the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Program “Europe’s Future.” His areas of expertise include the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Israeli-Arab conflict, the EU’s relations with the Gulf region, economic developments in the Arab world, and the causes of flight and migration.

Etienne Höra is Project Manager in the ‘Europe’s Future’ programme at Bertelsmann Stiftung. His focus lies on the EU’s trade policy in this geoeconomic age, as well as the consequences of China’s increasing assertiveness for the EU.

Cora Jungbluth is Senior Expert in the Europe’s Future Programme at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Her research focus is on China, foreign direct investment and international trade, especially the role of emerging economies.

Miriam Kosmehl is Senior Expert on Eastern Europe in the Europe’s Future Programme at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Her recent research focus has been on the strategic management of geoeconomic interdependencies and geopolitical antagonisms, as well as on Ukraine, including the Ukrainian economy’s preparedness for EU accession, Ukraine’s future competitiveness, and the nation’s economic reconstruction and territorial inequalities.

Peter Walkenhorst is Senior Project Manager in Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Europe’s Future Program, where he works on transatlantic relations and European-Chinese relations. Previously, he was a member of the foundation’s Germany and Asia Program, responsible for projects on the systemic conflict with China and social cohesion in Asia.

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