Making predictions in politics and international relations is never easy. Even for events that are marked on the calendar, such as elections and summits, unforeseen circumstances can cloud foresight concerning their outcomes. But each year we try make a few predictions, based on our research and insights, about pivotal dynamics that will determine Europe’s future.  

In January 2024, we looked ahead to a busy calendar of elections, as well as the G7’s declining collective power and the relative rise in significance of BRICS+. It was clear then the political right would be stronger in Europe after multiple elections, but the sweeping losses by incumbents, now a major narrative for this year, was not a foregone conclusion.  

Looking ahead to 2025, here is our best attempt to pick out upcoming major events and trends. But perhaps only by year’s end will the connecting threads reveal themselves. 

Europe is entering its most dangerous year of the century – Christian Mölling

Europe faces a confluence of challenges in 2025 that may mark its most perilous year of the century so far. Political fragmentation, economic weakness and geopolitical tensions intersect, creating a volatile landscape.

Domestically, Europe is plagued by fragile leadership. France is consumed by domestic unrest, limiting its ability to lead on the international stage. Germany is approaching pivotal elections, leaving its government in a politically weakened state for weeks, if not months. The UK government faces a tired society and tight budgets. Across the continent, unity is elusive as states remain divided over critical issues, from security to energy policy to migration. Economically, Europe is vulnerable. Stagnation, inflation and energy uncertainty have sapped resilience, reducing the capacity to address simultaneous crises.

These weaknesses are exacerbated by an unpredictable international environment. The war in Ukraine confronts Europe with a trilemma: Escalating involvement risks deeper entanglement; insufficient engagement could embolden Russian aggression; and a prolonged stalemate prolongs instability. Meanwhile, a potential second geopolitical front has opened up in the Middle East. Tensions involving Syria, Iran, and Israel risk sparking wider conflict, with ripple effects threatening European security and cohesion. The fact that interest and engagements from the US, China, Russia, Europe and Iran take place and interact in the geopolitical hotspots of the Middle East and Eastern Europe make these two regions one strategic theatre.

The uncertainty surrounding the next US administration – particularly under the return of Trump – raises questions about transatlantic cooperation. A less supportive or divisive US approach could fracture European unity, leaving individual states susceptible to manipulation by external powers, such as Russia or China.

In this precarious situation, Europe’s disunity could become its greatest liability. A failure to act collectively risks leaving the continent as a geopolitical pawn in the strategies of others. To navigate this turbulent year, Europe must overcome internal divisions and project a unified front, leveraging its collective strength to address these cascading threats. Without decisive action, Europe may face a year defined by fragmentation, instability and diminished global influence.

Trump returns four years after the Capitol was stormed – Brandon Bohrn and Peter Walkenhorst 

The year starts with a seminal event that no one can deny will be year-defining: The return of Donald Trump. On 20 January, Trump will be sworn in as President of the United States for the second time. His return to the White House means profound changes for Europe, and especially for Germany. Driven by an aggressive, protectionist agenda, Trump’s policies could radically reshape transatlantic security, support for Ukraine, economic and trade relations, technology policy, and, at the same time, strengthen anti-democratic forces in Europe. 

Unconstrained by re-election pressures and surrounded from day one by loyal advisors, Trump will likely pursue a far more disruptive agenda than he did in his first term from 2017 to 2021. So far, Trump’s nominations for his cabinet and other key government posts suggest these fears are more than justified. 

A second Trump administration could withdraw the US from NATO – or at least weaken the American pillar of the alliance – making security commitments conditional on a sharp increase in European defence spending. The US could further cut support for Ukraine and impose tariffs on European exports that could strain economic ties. 

European leaders have already offered welcoming gestures to the President-elect, including NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s trip to Mar-a-Lago and French President Emannuel Macron’s trilateral meeting with Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris. Behind the scenes, however, European leaders are preparing for a far different response based on which of Trump’s previous statements – and outright threats – will become policy following Inauguration Day.  

New EU-Middle East partnerships for 2025: Realistic goals or a toothless ambition? – Christian Hanelt 

The EU’s wish list for the Middle East is long and challenging. For one, as Syria tries to move forward after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the EU is keen for citizens to benefit from good, inclusive governance. Another priority is strengthening Israeli and Palestinian organisations who work jointly for a two-state-solution. In general, the difficult relations between the EU and Türkiye are a detriment to EU influence in the region, so rebuilding this relationship is an important goal for 2025. And finally, for the Mediterranean region as a whole, climate action, job creation and fair migration remain ongoing aims. To achieve some of these goals, the six Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council will be important partners for the EU.

Dubravka Šuica, the EU Commissioner specifically dedicated to the Mediterranean and the Middle East region, has been tasked with building stronger partnerships between the EU and all countries across the Mediterranean. Šuica is expected to engage in conflict resolution, closely cooperating with Kaja Kallas, the new Commission Vice-President and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

To achieve these ambitions, the political support of EU member states for Commission and Council initiatives is essential. This will require the creation of unified positions in word and deed, combined with financial coordination by European and member state institutions.  

If EU and member states remain stuck in empty declarations and blocked by conflicting national interests, then President-elect Donald Trump – and others outside Europe – will create the facts on the ground in the European neighbourhood.

For example, if Trump withdraws US troops from eastern Syria, the Kurds there would be weakened, especially if Türkiye’s army and affiliated Syrian Sunni militias attack them further. This shift in power could open up opportunities for Islamic State terrorists take more ground. Furthermore, Russia is already withdrawing military capacity from Syria, which is good news for the West, but bad news could follow. The Kremlin intends to station them in eastern Libya, which may trouble Europe even more in another volatile situation. 

Even though he is not yet in office, Trump’s statements are already bringing change to the Middle East. If the ceasefire in Lebanon holds – an agreement in itself that some are attributing at least in part to the incoming Trump administration – depends on EU-US practical financial and technical support for the Lebanese army to support its takeover of Hezbollah territory in the south, and on strengthening the mandate of the international peacekeepers, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), to keep the Israeli-Lebanese border stable. 

The EU must find the capacity to deal with these complex situations – in parallel to developments Ukraine – from a position of unity. 

Will Germany become a ‘good European’ again? – Malte Zabel  

On 23 February, Germans will elect a new Bundestag following the early ending in autumn 2024 of the so-called traffic light coalition of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals. European reactions to the coalition’s breakdown have been mixed. Some were concerned about Germany’s political stability, while others, albeit quietly, felt a sense of relief.

The coalition’s internal disputes often had tangible consequences at the EU level, leading to abstentions and broken compromises on important issues. Notably, Germany imposed a last-minute blockade of the 2035 combustion engine ban, despite prior agreement. Additionally, Germany faced criticism for insufficient coordination with European partners, exemplified by Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s 2022 energy price break – which he described as a “double whammy” – or his phone call with Vladimir Putin last November.

The key question is whether Germany will return as a so-called better European after the federal election? The latest polls indicate that Friedrich Merz, a CDU colleague of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, might be the next chancellor.

Merz, who has been a member of the European Parliament and German Bundestag, has repeatedly emphasised the importance of coordinating with European partners, taking a leading role in Europe, and supporting Ukraine by supplying its military with long-range missiles. On the last point, he sets himself apart from Scholz, but the rest of his rhetoric is what would be expected from any centrist chancellor candidate.

Much will depend on what a post-election coalition might look like. As the odds stand, it looks as if it might come down to a coalition between the CDU/CSU, along with either the SPD or the Greens. In this scenario, no major changes in content would be expected – it would simply be easier to coordinate between two partners instead of three. If there is a more unlikely three-way alliance, the coordination of European policy could again become bumpy, especially on economic and fiscal policy issues.

As sanctions on Russia finally bite, will Trump help or hurt?  – Thieß Petersen 

Since Russia attacked Ukraine, sanctions against the aggressor have increased. The EU imposed its fourteenth package of sanctions in June 2024 and 2024 closed with the bloc agreeing on a fifteenth.

Western sanctions are now making a bigger impact, just as incoming US President Donald Trump is clear that he will push for a deal between Russia and Ukraine. Continued or even increased sanctions pressure from the US and the EU during 2025 may be the leverage required to force Russia to compromise.

Historical experience shows that in the short term, many negative effects can be cushioned in the sanctioned country. But the longer sanctions are in place, the more severe the economic damage. A good indicator of the effectiveness of the sanctions is the performance of the Russian currency. It has depreciated significantly in recent years. In recent months, this depreciation has been particularly steep. A weak ruble makes all imported products more expensive, increasing the cost of living for Russian people.

Rising import prices increase inflationary pressure in Russia. To control inflation, the Russian central bank raised its key interest rate from 18 percent to 21 percent in October 2024, where it remains. In summer 2020, it was just 4.25 percent.

Will 2025 be the year that sanctions push Russia to change course? In short, this depends on external factors. The US is vital to the effectiveness of the sanctions because tougher US sanctions reinforce the EU’s efforts. If the West imposes sanctions against countries that help Russia circumvent sanctions, the impact increases.

Finally, if the US massively ramps up oil production, as announced by Trump, this would reduce the global market price for oil – and therefore Russia’s government revenues. These actions could create a recession in Russia. If Trump wants to increase pressure on Putin, this would be a good move, but it remains to be seen how the incoming president will choose to influence this precarious situation.

Avoiding missteps on the road to EU enlargement – Miriam Kosmehl

As geopolitical rivalries intensified, the EU Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 underscored enlargement as a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity for the next policy and legislative cycle. But past enlargement successes should not obscure the risks of falling short in today’s context.

Many eastern candidate countries joined NATO before entering the EU. This provided a critical security framework for their transition. The latest US elections have shattered any illusions of outsourcing European security, emphasising the EU’s responsibility to act decisively.

In response to Russian aggression against Ukraine, the EU resurrected its enlargement plans to support Ukraine, reinvigorating the Western Balkans’ accession process. Reaffirming the Western Balkans’ commitment to EU membership, along with the necessity of long-term, irreversible reforms rooted in EU values, is critical at this juncture to maintain momentum and credibility.

The opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine in 2024, despite the ongoing full-scale war, marks a bold step in EU-Ukraine relations. Yet this move also heightens expectations that, if unmet, could lead to disillusionment and erode trust in the EU’s commitments.

As 2025 unfolds, EU member states must navigate the dual challenges of integrating war- and conflict-affected candidate countries, while maintaining internal unity and addressing broader security uncertainties. Failing to align enlargement with robust security measures could exacerbate vulnerabilities. To prevent setbacks, a clear strategy linking enlargement and security is essential, ensuring the integration of both Ukraine and the southeastern European candidates strengthens the EU and enhances regional stability.

Reconnecting the EU with the UK – Jake Benford

The EU and the UK have committed to resetting post-Brexit relations, a consequence of a changed geopolitical landscape and new political management in the UK. Developing a rudimentary trade agreement into a full-fledged security partnership will be a long-term process, but 2025 will undoubtedly kickstart the process required to make this objective a reality.

A first EU-UK summit will take place in the first half of the year. A likely deliverable will be a non-binding Security and Defence Partnership, similar to the agreements the EU has with Norway, South Korea, Japan and Moldova. This would allow both sides to spell out joint interests and translate election manifestos into formal commitments and processes. The main role of such an agreement would be to act as a bridge towards negotiating potentially binding agreements across sensitive areas.

These would include strengthening cooperation on Ukraine (for instance, by tightening existing cooperation on sanctions), formalising foreign policy and security cooperation (for instance, through a framework agreement enabling joint missions and operations), setting out a pathway to involve the UK in EU defence industrial funding programmes, and exploring closer cooperation – or even alignment – on economic security. A key issue will be whether the EU agrees to conclude this separately from some of its offensive asks in different areas (notably youth mobility and fishing rights).

Progress on security and resilience matters may be conducive to better trade and investment relations – in particular, the UK is suffering from the impact of trade friction. Specifically, the UK is keen to conclude a new deal to ease trade in foodstuffs, which, in turn, will help UK growth. But since Labour’s red lines on single market proximity will hold for the remaining UK parliament, expect no shifting of the dial over the next twelve months.

Trump’s second term may tempt parts of the UK system to look towards Washington, where Trump’s allies will try to divide the EU by enticing the UK to chart an unsustainable transatlantic course. This means Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s pro-European instincts are likely to be tested, especially if the EU proves to be an inflexible negotiator.

2025 could be the EU’s geopolitical apocalypse – Cora Jungbluth

The EU has the potential to be the third geopolitical player next to the US and China, hence the much-discussed vision. However, 2025 could instead prove to be the EU’s geopolitical apocalypse. Here are two reasons why.

  1. China could use the expected period of insecurity after Trump’s inauguration to test the waters in the Taiwan Strait. For example, Beijing could start a low-profile blockade. Depending on the assertiveness of a potential US reaction, China could push the blockade further or resolve it.Since Trump’s stance on Taiwan appears volatile, China could try and use his second term to push the resolution of the “Taiwan issue” as far as possible. Trump’s declared goal is for China to buy more American goods and level the trade balance. To achieve this aim, Taiwan could even end up as a pawn in any sort of deal between the US and China.The EU risks being a mere bystander here because it potentially lacks the political will and unity to use whatever little leverage it may have. But the bloc will still have to suffer the consequences of political wrangling between the US and China, such as issues regarding chip supply.
  2. From China’s perspective, Trump’s return represents an opportunity to reset EU-China relations. China might even envision some kind of EU-China anti-Trump alliance to de-risk away from the US.A massive charm offensive in European capitals is to be expected, which, in some cases, might find more fertile soil than in the past four years.This would mean that coordination on China-related issues will be even more difficult to achieve, if at all, in times when constructive cooperation is desperately needed.Nevertheless, China should not set its hopes and ambitions too high.As the EU is overly dependent on the US for security, Trump might blackmail Europeans into following his agenda on China. This, in turn, might focus more on de-coupling, especially technologically, rather than de-risking.
    He might be less charming in this endeavour than Beijing’s rhetorically adept cadres, but – given US leverage over Europe – certainly more effective, leaving the EU with little to no room to manoeuvre.

Germany’s Zeitenwende under new management – Torben Schütz

Following the collapse of the German three-party traffic-light coalition in November 2024, late February will see premature federal elections in Europe’s largest economy. This will lead to a foreign policy slumber until a new government is formed, which will probably take place around Easter.

This new government will have an impact on any number of policy areas, but for security and defence this means Germany’s (in)famous Zeitenwende – the project for action proclaimed by now-ex Chancellor Olaf Scholz – comes under new management.

With a significant defence industrial base and military capabilities, Germany remains a cornerstone of European defence. Whether the country continues to “muddle through” in its support for Ukraine and the build-up of industrial capacity or pivots to a more assertive position vis-à-vis Russia will affect Ukraine’s ability to fend off the Russian invasion.

Moreover, Germany’s defence spending and force reconstitution affect what the European pillar of NATO can offer a new Trump administration in exchange for continued US support in selected defence areas – from nuclear sharing to the stationing of long-range precision strike systems in Germany.

Lastly, a new German government will have to decide with whom to align its security and defence policy. While Scholz favoured close alignment with President Joe Biden, which meant sometimes going against close European allies, it is likely that this position will shift with changes in government in the US and here in Berlin.

As a major export nation with low defence spending, Germany attracted Trump’s disfavour during his first term – something neither its support for Ukraine nor the Zeitenwende rhetoric changed. The second Trump presidency therefore risks deepening Germany’s political isolation, especially as the country faces government paralysis at the crucial moment of Trump’s inauguration and is particularly vulnerable to Trump’s likely trade policies.

But this could be the wake-up call Germany needs to abandon its increasingly isolating Sonderweg and adopt a cooperative European approach. 2025 will therefore determine whether Germany reclaims its central role in Europe or faces lasting marginalization – an outcome that would be disastrous for both Germany and Europe.

Will total defence go European in 2025? – Helena Quis 

The Nordic and Baltic states are pioneers in total defence, integrating military readiness with societal resilience to counter hybrid and conventional threats. But their approach has not gained significant traction across Europe. As the EU confronts increasingly sophisticated challenges – ranging from foreign disinformation campaigns to critical infrastructure attacks – the need for a unified, whole-of-society response has never been more urgent.

Despite progress through legislation, such as the Critical Entity Resilience (CER) and Network and Information Security 2 (NIS2) directives, Europe lacks a cohesive framework to address cross-cutting threats. Finland’s former President Sauli Niinistö underscored this vulnerability in his October report, warning against fragmented, lowest-common-denominator solutions.

In 2025, the question will be on whether the Nordic and Baltic states can rally broader EU adoption of their comprehensive preparedness mindset. The European Commission must lead the charge, embedding resilience into EU systems while accounting for member states’ varying capacities and political and regulatory frameworks. However, political will remains the critical variable.

Will the Nordic and Baltic states succeed in exporting their logic of total defence to a hesitant Europe? The answer depends on unpredictable developments. An escalation of hybrid attacks by Russia or China could act as shock therapy, disrupting Europe’s peacetime thinking. Germany, often a target and increasingly aware of the need for total defence, could become a key catalyst under a new government.

Conversely, a weak diplomatic deal with Russia, possible under a second Trump administration, could undermine joint European efforts before they even start. Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, which directly threatens NATO and the EU, Europe still lacks a shared view of the Russian threat. This makes it all too easy for some countries to fall back on old patterns of good faith in a Russia tamed by diplomatic means. As a key foreign policy ally of the Baltic and Nordic states and a vocal Russia critic, Poland could serve as a vital warning voice during its EU presidency.

The EU’s Clean Industrial Plan needs ambition and realism in 2025 – Lucas Resende Carvalho

On 26 February, the European Commission will unveil its Clean Industrial Deal (CID) aiming to provide a roadmap to implement the Draghi report’s vision of driving economic growth through decarbonisation. The action plan is expected to include a comprehensive set of initiatives, goals and frameworks to revive the EU’s stuttering economy and prepare for a clean energy future – a race in which the EU threatens to fall behind its global competitors.

Its immediate relevance lies in mitigating rising energy costs. European energy prices are twice as much as the US and China, making it difficult for businesses to be competitive. Similarly, the plan needs a framework for effective strategic supply chain management. Here, targeted state interventions must avoid the inefficiency and mismanagement that affects the whole EU economy. The struggles of the battery manufacturer Northvolt and Germany’s failed investment in an Intel chip factory are prime examples.

In the long term, the CID will be a touchstone for the EU’s ability to develop a coherent industrial strategy. To achieve this, the CID must address gaps left by past Green Deal initiatives that lack the structural pillars of a unified EU industrial policy. Instead, this responsibility is largely confined to individual member states, perpetuating inefficiencies and single market fragmentation.

The CID’s success will depend on articulating a clear strategic vision, defining the EU’s industrial future and identifying market inefficiencies. Developing this vision requires a shared understanding of EU strengths and weaknesses – and political consensus to avoid repeating the counterproductive piecemeal approach.

The historic lack of strategic vision has limited the EU industrial policy toolbox to regulatory measures, such as relaxing state aid rules during the energy crisis. Meanwhile, EU green industrial policy is largely limited to trade policy measures.

Now, the Commission has the chance with the CID to lay the foundation for a strategic, ambitious, actionable vision. There are promising signs that the CID will offer a more effective path forward where previous plans lacked punch. But the CID is only the starting point.

Meaningful regulation and sustained effort are needed for a well-defined industrial strategy with clear goals, priorities, accountability – and a comprehensive toolbox for strategic intervention. But first, getting the initial framework right is critical.

Navigating uncertainty in transatlantic security relations – Brandon Bohrn

Speculation about the next Trump presidency and its effects remains as uncertain as Schrödinger’s cat. But any supposition will end – likely abruptly – on 20 January’s Inauguration Day.

US engagement in Europe is critical, not only for Ukraine’s resilience, but for NATO’s ability to deter and defend against large-scale aggression on European soil. How the new administration recalibrates its involvement – whether in scale, scope or conditionality – will make an impact on Europe’s security landscape.

Based on Trump’s statements and his prospective team of cabinet members and advisors, a departure from Biden’s policies is expected, particularly on US support for Ukraine. Trump has repeatedly questioned NATO’s relevance, hinted at a US withdrawal from the alliance and openly cast doubt about whether the US would honour its collective defence agreements under Article 5.

During and after Trump’s first term, measures to Trump-proof NATO, such as requiring congressional approval for a US withdrawal, were implemented. However, Europe could still experience a plethora of policies from Washington that weaken the US pillar of the alliance, undermining NATO and thereby European security.

June’s NATO Summit in The Hague will provide critical insights into how a Trump 2.0 administration will engage with European allies. Will Trump even attend or send JD Vance in his place? Will Trump place conditions on US support for increased defence spending by European NATO members? Will a US-led ceasefire agreement in Ukraine take shape or will the US withdraw its support for Ukraine and its commitments made at previous NATO gatherings?

In the lead-up to what will likely be a contentious summit, Europe will face growing pressure from Washington to increase defence spending and shoulder greater responsibility for conventional military activities, especially as the US shifts its strategic focus toward the Asia-Pacific region.

Europe must prepare for a worst-case scenario with a long-term strategy in mind. Maintaining the US as a robust security and defence partner is in Europe’s best interests, but overreliance poses risks. Strengthening European defence capabilities and fostering greater strategic autonomy would not only enhance Europe’s resilience, but fortify transatlantic security relations for the future.

Read more

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Europe Reacts to Trump: What to Expect in Security and Defence Policy

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